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ABSTRACT 
 
Superpower Ideology: What a Century of Venezuela in The New York Times  
 
Can Tell Us About Ourselves 
 
by 
Sara Louise Keever, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2007 
SUPERVISOR: Dustin Harp 
 
 This thesis explores the role of news discourse in the reproduction of dominant 
international structures of power by focusing on the case study of Venezuela in The New 
York Times editorials over the course of the twentieth century.  As a leading source of 
international news in the U.S., the Times occupies an influential position in 
disseminating and reproducing understandings of the world and our relationships in it.  
In this analysis, I look at how The New York Times defines, stages and delimits the roles 
of Venezuela and the U.S. in the international community, and how these constructions 
of knowledge work discursively to maintain international structures of power.  Drawing 
from a neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony and a postcolonial theoretical perspective of 
the ideology of modernization, I employ a broad historical approach to the role of the 
Times in this international relationship, finding that the rationality of the editorials often 
resembles colonialist discourse. 
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  1
INTRODUCTION 
 
On April 13, 2002, in response to a military coup against Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chávez, The New York Times published an editorial stating: “With yesterday’s 
resignation of President Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan democracy is no longer threatened by 
a would-be dictator.  Mr. Chávez, a ruinous demagogue, stepped down after the military 
intervened and handed power to a respected business leader, Pedro Carmona” (“Hugo 
Chávez Departs,” 2002, p. A16).  According to Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic 
and Policy Research, this statement likely constituted “the first time in more than 25 
years that they [The New York Times] supported a military coup against a democratic 
government” (Weisbrot & Chávez, 2003).  On April 12, however, massive public protest 
in Venezuela had signaled a refusal among citizens to accept the coup.  Democratically-
elected Chávez, who had refused to resign, was reinstalled as president the same day this 
editorial was published. 
The U.S. media has long been criticized by concerned scholars and activists for its 
portrayal of the political situation in Venezuela (e.g. Delacour, 2005).  Journalist and 
Latin American historian Richard Gott (2005) has accused the prestige press of ignoring 
the rural and poor majority of Venezuelans and instead absorbing a more elite, urban 
point of view opposed to Chávez and his political reforms.  “Rarely,” he has argued, “have 
political developments in an important country – one of the great oil producers of the 
Western world – been so inadequately reported and analyzed by the foreign media” (p. 
246).  In an earlier quantitative framing analysis, I found that, from 2001 to 2005, The 
New York Times systematically excluded frames such as racism, redistribution of 
resources, disadvantages of international free trade policy, and Venezuelan national 
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sovereignty, while emphasizing frames such as oil and trade interests, bureaucratic 
friction, violence, and Communist authoritarianism (Keever, 2005).   
In this study, I focus on a different approach to U.S. coverage of Venezuela, 
delving deeper into the ideological implications of what a Venezuelan lawyer and activist 
has called “the extreme levels of distortion, lack of fact checking and source verification 
and outright manipulation of information in the U.S. media on Venezuela” (Golinger, 
2007).  The central questions in this study are: How does The New York Times define, 
stage and delimit the roles of Venezuela and the U.S. in the international community?  
How are these constructions of knowledge reproduced or challenged over time?  How do 
they work discursively to maintain international structures of power? 
Studies of news media and ideology document the social construction of 
particular values in the news media with the goal of contributing to a larger, more 
complex understanding of hegemony.  In journalism studies, this area of research has 
developed into a concept of framing that illuminates the ideological work done by the 
selection, emphasis and exclusion of frames in the news (Entman, 1993; Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Reese, et al., 2001).  One difficulty with the concept of 
framing, however, is how to conduct an ideological study of news frames without 
devolving into a bias study that fails to draw out implications and impact the reader.   
It is the hope of this study of Venezuela in the U.S. press to draw attention to 
certain theoretical and analytical tools which journalism studies have been slow to 
incorporate but which could add to a substantial understanding of ideology, news 
discourse, and social structures.  The critical approach of this study draws from linguistic 
theories of metaphor; Foucauldian concepts of discourse, knowledge, and power; and 
  3
postcolonial approaches that insist on a broad notion of history and nuanced 
understanding of context.   
Ideology and Hegemony 
In his book Public Opinion (1922/1965), Walter Lippmann suggested that a 
discrepancy exists between a real environment and a “pseudoenvironment” created by 
the news media.  Since this early proposition that the news media do more than mirror 
reality, many scholars have come to argue that the news media also play a large role in 
constructing and maintaining social values and relationships.  Some explanations argue 
that the media transmit these values from a small group of pro-active senders to the 
masses of passive receivers; others counter that media work more like a means of 
practicing and negotiating values.  The actual processes most likely lie somewhere in 
between.   
Generally speaking, the media assemble, construct, and package social meaning, 
allowing us to communicate and share cultural, political, and moral values across 
neighborhoods, cities, nations and the globe.  For many studies of news construction, the 
central concern in all these aspects deals with the question of power.  Which values do 
we accept as normal?  Why those values and not others?  To what end?  At whose 
expense?  These are the questions of ideology that underlie studies of news media as 
socio-cultural institutions which communicate ideologies in society with real political 
and economic consequences. 
While ideology is a notoriously difficult concept to define, this study rests on the 
Gramscian-inspired understanding that Stuart Hall (1986) has described as “the mental 
framework – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the 
systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to 
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make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (p. 29).  
The ongoing ideological struggle over “common sense” is the struggle over the political 
and economic power to define the world and our relationships to it and to each other.   
Even though Marx himself did not use the term “ideology” as one clearly unified 
concept (Thompson, 1990), the current understandings of the concept build on his 
critique of economic domination.  In their famous passage from German Ideology, Marx 
and Engels (1970) argued that:  
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.  
The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control 
at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally 
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject 
to it. (p. 64)  
 
Much work has been done since to understand how this happens and, more complexly, 
why the dominating ideas at times fail to control and must evolve in response to 
resistance.   
 Theorists that are often called Neo-Marxists, such as Antonio Gramsci, Louis 
Althusser and Georg Lukács, incorporated concepts of culture and ideology to 
supplement this critique of domination (Kellner, 1995).  In an effort to resist the 
economic reductionism that limits the potential for orthodox Marxism to explain the 
complexities of social life, Gramsci employed the term “hegemony” to more generally 
apply to the struggles of all classes (Mouffe, 1979).  Hegemony better defines the 
complex cultural and ideological processes through which dominated groups come to 
support the ideas of those in power (Gramsci, 1971).  Additionally, Althusser (1971) 
continued to build on this lineage by suggesting that “ideology represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their conditions of existence” (p. 162).  According to 
Althusser, this imaginary relationship exists materially in and is reproduced by social 
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institutions, which he called Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), such as the 
educational system, family, mass media, etc.  The net effect of the ideology that connects 
so many institutional realities to personal beliefs is a reproduction of the submission of 
dominated groups to the established relationships and values (Althusser, 1971). 
 The theoretical lineage of the concept of ideology is long and complex.  For the 
purposes of this study, however, we can understand that there exists a complex 
relationship between media as social institutions, individual beliefs and actions, and 
ideologies that maintain (and sometimes challenge) the structures of power.  Contrary to 
orthodox Marxism, which reduces ideology to economic class interests, many current 
critics argue that ideology should be extended to cover theories, ideas, texts, and 
representations that legitimate the interests of the ruling gender, race and class (Kellner, 
1995). 
Stuart Hall of the British Cultural Studies group played a significant role in 
applying the concept of hegemony to communication studies.  According to Hall (1982), 
hegemony implied more of a concept of “cultural leadership” than “ideological 
compulsion,” meaning that an alliance of dominant classes: 
extends and expands its mastery over society in such a way that it can transform 
and re-fashion its ways of life, its mores and conceptualization, its very form and 
level of culture and civilization in a direction which, while not directly paying 
immediate profits to the narrow interests of any particular class, favours the 
development and expansion of the dominant social and productive system of life 
as a whole. (p. 85) 
 
Through cultural leadership, the dominant groups win the consent and active support of 
other groups and classes subordinate to the system.  Through admirations of and 
aspirations to leadership, we support and contribute to the hegemonic worldview, which 
Hall (1980) has described as defining “within its terms the mental horizon, the universe, 
of possible meanings, of a whole sector of relations in society or culture,” and carrying 
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“with it the stamp of legitimacy – it appears coterminous with what is ‘natural,’ 
‘inevitable,’ ‘taken for granted’ about the social order” (p. 137). 
A hegemonic viewpoint, however, cannot be a completely integrated and solid 
structure.  It must bend and adapt to resistance or the entire power structure would not 
survive.  In news discourse, certain oppositional views are present and at times challenge 
the dominant interests (Carragee, 1993).  (Often the contradictory values that surface to 
contest each other are both derived from the same ideological view.)  Hall’s oft-quoted 
concept of dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings applies here.  Even though 
there is no necessary correspondence between ideologically encoded messages and the 
receiver’s decoding of that message, a pattern of “preferred readings” emerges due to the 
reliance of hegemonic domination on common sense (Hall, 1980).   
A major implication of preferred readings in terms of news discourse is that they 
are so consistently reproduced at the expense of alternative worldviews and ways of 
thinking about social relationships.  As a hegemonic apparatus, mass media play an 
important role in maintaining the dominant ideology.  The study of journalism in 
particular – given its explicit profession in objectivity, balance and fact – provides an 
excellent means of unpacking and making visible the very kernels of social, political and 
economic common sense, or taken-for-grantedness.   
Discourse Analysis 
A thorough discourse analysis is an attempt to make visible the invisible 
dimensions of ideology – linguistic, material, historical and cultural – embedded in a 
particular text or practice.  The analysis of discourse, ideology and power draws from a 
poststructuralist understanding of language that points to the constructed nature of 
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knowledge.  De-linking the connection between signifier and signified, this work helped 
to show how hegemony works through discourse.  As Laclau has (1993) written:  
there is a proliferation of “floating signifiers” in society, and political competition 
can be seen as attempts by rival political forces to partially fix those signifiers to 
particular signifying configurations.  Discursive struggles about the ways of fixing 
the meaning of a signifier like “democracy,” for instance, are central to explain 
the political semantics of our contemporary political world.  This partial fixing of 
the relation between signifier and signified is what…is called “hegemony.” (p. 
435) 
 
The “partial fixing” is not arbitrary, but rather is related to material and cultural power 
to engage with and influence discourse and is thus contingent.  Although ideological 
struggle cannot be reduced to discourse, communication occupies a central role in 
expressing, implementing, reproducing, constructing and altering the principles that 
form the basis of worldviews.   
The analysis of mass media texts allows a window into the forms of ideological 
discourse that take hold.  Calling for more empirical research on ideology and discourse, 
Teun van Dijk (1998) has argued that “if we want to know what ideologies actually look 
like, how they work, and how they are created, changed and reproduced, we need to look 
closely at their discursive manifestations” (p. 6).  For ideological discourse on 
modernization, the role of the state, and international policy, U.S. news coverage of 
Venezuela serves as the window of analysis for this study.  By looking closely at the types 
of talk that are used in this coverage, I hope to identify specific struggles in the attempts 
to define, stage and delimit concepts of U.S. global hegemony.  Among various “types of 
talk,” the analysis of metaphor is a particularly colorful and powerful way to grasp 
ideological content. 
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Metaphor in Discourse 
Unlocking metaphors has been a powerful tool of semiotic analysis of media 
content (Berger, 1998).  Rather than providing a list of lexical features, the analysis of 
metaphor allows us to unpack language using political, historical and contextual 
evidence – possibly capturing a link between language and discourse.  This contributes 
to an understanding of how common sense and ideology function through a web of 
schemas and analogies.  As Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their seminal work on 
metaphors have argued, “metaphor is not just a matter of language, that is, of mere 
words…on the contrary, human thought processes are largely metaphorical” (p. 6).  The 
metaphorical nature of thought creates the “natural” understandings that make common 
sense and hegemony so powerful.  According to Lakoff and Johnson, we gain 
understanding of an abstract concept by comparing it to a more directly experienced 
concept.  For example, Ghafele (2004) found in her analysis of the metaphors of 
globalization and trade concerning Africa two systematic analogies: 1) Africa’s 
complexities are understood in terms of pathology, wherein an ill and passive patient is 
in need of the medication of globalization, which often has bad side effects and is 
administered by an educated and authoritative doctor; and 2) modernization in Africa is 
understood via a fast-moving train – linear, irreversible, unstoppable – that should not 
be missed.   
A metaphor works by highlighting certain aspects of the two concepts being 
compared and ignoring other characteristics that do not apply to the particular 
metaphorical understanding.  Given that a metaphor highlights some characteristics and 
ignores others in order to create an analogy between two concepts, as the highlighted 
characteristics become common sense, the hidden ones become non-existent.  The 
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ideological implications lie in this highlighting and hiding work of metaphors.  For 
example, the authors pointed out that the belief that labor is a resource, a metaphor used 
to understand the abstract concept of labor in terms of a concrete natural resource or 
commodity, obscures the distinction between meaningful labor and dehumanizing 
labor.  As a commodity, undifferentiated labor is expected to compete in a market that 
consistently drives down the cost of labor.  Cheap labor, they argued, becomes 
understood as desirable and necessary via this metaphor, and the ideological 
implications can be seen in the understanding of virtual slavery around the world as 
“natural.”  For Lakoff and Johnson, the problematic issue of metaphors is less the truth 
or falsity of the representation than the “perceptions and inferences that follow from it 
and the actions that are sanctioned by it” (p. 158). 
Drawing on the constructivist paradigm that arose from poststructuralist critique 
and on findings in cognitive science, Santa Ana (2002) has examined metaphor as a 
“principle unit of hegemonic expression” in discursive practice (p. 9).  Analyzing public 
discourse on three California propositions in the 1990s – to restrict immigrant access to 
public services and bilingual education and to end affirmative action in higher education 
– Santa Ana found metaphors used in The Los Angeles Times as powerful cognitive maps 
of the debates.  He showed how different groups shaped, limited and defined the terms 
of debate by using vivid metaphors of the body, land, water, war and machinery.  
“Everyday metaphor,” he argued “weaves the patterns of social relations into natural 
language expression” (p. 20).  Arguing against the positivist understanding of metaphor 
as rhetorical frills that reflect and picture everyday life, Santa Ana (2002) pointed to 
reaction-time experiments that show faster comprehension when metaphors are used.  If 
metaphors were simply expressions painted over the literal world, translation from 
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figurative to literal meaning would take longer, not shorter processing time to 
comprehend.  The inference drawn from such cognitive research is that metaphor is a 
process of construction of meaning through complex maps, schemas and informational 
networks in the brain; metaphor more than reflects reality, it constructs how we process 
reality. 
This understanding of maps and schemas is similar to the understanding of 
ideology used by Stuart Hall and also Teun van Dijk.  The metaphors used in discourse 
are a means of fixing certain floating signifiers, creating systems of representation that 
make sense of the world.  Metaphors are not a static, fixed aspect of discourse, but rather 
reflect systematic concepts that structure our actions and thoughts.  The connection 
between structural concept and action is a dialectical one, always dynamic, and the 
potential for change or a rupture in the structure occurs each time the metaphorical 
concept is put into practice.  This potential leads toward emergent metaphors and 
concepts that challenge and reorient analogies and beliefs.   
Schön (1979), for example, has argued that the metaphorical understanding of 
low-income neighborhoods as diseased and decaying urban blight has a strong influence 
on the policymaking approaches to such neighborhoods that attempt to cure the disease 
and eradicate slums.  He argued that an alternative understanding of such 
neighborhoods as remarkably adaptable, resourceful and creative “folk communities” 
may encourage alternative policy approaches.  This example illuminates the connection 
between thought and action and the role of metaphor in actual power structures. 
After Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s recent speech to the U.N., including 
his rhetorical flourishes comparing President Bush to the devil, the Venezuelan president 
is by now familiar among many Americans, as is the Bush administration’s strained 
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relationship with Chávez.  As public discourse grows on this international topic, it is 
important to monitor how our arguments and actions become defined and staged, as 
they are certain to contribute to the struggle to define a global life worth living.  In 
monitoring this flow of discourse, metaphors provide schematic clues: “Conventional 
metaphors set up relations that are deeply fixed in everyday thinking and are 
reconstructed from moment to moment as people talk” (Santa Ana, 2002, p. 40).  This 
aspect of ideological thinking can help explain both why structures seem so determining 
and inert and also how change is possible at all.  Santa Ana has proposed conceiving 
language as a toolmaker, rather than a tool, that can replace and revise deficient 
understandings and mappings with alternative ones. 
Venezuela’s Political Background 
 This study attempts to address the challenge presented by the work of 
postcolonial theorists, such as Edward Said, to broaden our horizons both globally and 
historically when analyzing discourse.  Many journalism studies have analyzed the 
ideological implications of the Cold war for the U.S. news media, but few go as far back 
as the era of high colonialism and imperialism.  This study will analyze The New York 
Times’ editorials concerning Venezuela over the last century.  Although the current 
international situation between the Bush and Chávez administrations is heated and at 
times rhetorically sensational, a historical approach to this international relationship is 
necessary to better comprehend the ideological work of the press.  This study will look at 
the three time periods within the last century in which the U.S. was relatively engaged 
with Venezuelan politics.   
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Colonial Era 
What this study terms the “Colonial Era” includes the years 1897 through 1908, a 
period during which the U.S. acquired its first overseas colonies and successfully 
challenged Europe as the dominant force in the Latin American region.   
Venezuela, after three hundred years of colonial history under Spanish rule, 
fought a regional war under the military general Simón Bolívar, declared independence 
in 1811 and established a republic.  Rebuffed in their attempts to sway the U.S. into 
intervening to help Venezuelans maintain independence, Bolívar and his companions 
became disillusioned with their hope for a pan-American republican solidarity in the face 
of Old World imperialism and monarchy (Ewell, 1996).  Instead of finding themselves 
welcomed into a brotherhood of principled democracy and national sovereignty, 
Venezuelans faced a superior and racist attitude from many U.S. diplomats and officials, 
who began to characterize their leaders early on as tyrants, imbeciles and dictators (ibid., 
p. 26).   
At the same time, commerce and trade were firmly established, and an 
independent Venezuela was considered by the U.S. as an important access point to South 
America.  Adelman (2002) has argued that the resulting system for Venezuela was a mix 
of colonial, caudillo, and market-oriented policy:  
Careful management of complex patronage networks ballasted, without fully 
legitimating, authoritarian political systems and capitalist property relations.  
Hybrid societies, graphically depicted by José Carlos Mariátegui, blended the 
coercion of colonial extractive traditions with unfettered markets, and wrapped a 
republican constitutional fabric around personal clientelist systems. (p. 43) 
 
According to John Lombardi (2003), the tradition of colonial extraction of coca 
and coffee extended into this period, constraining the possibilities of Venezuelan politics.  
(With the subsequent discovery of oil, these constraints only became more entrenched.)  
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The government that inherits this “Hispanic extractive engine,” according to Lombardi, 
is dependent on world prices for these commodities.  When the prices fall, the 
government often borrows money to maintain social stability and evidence of progress.  
This international debt, in turn, makes the government more dependent on the 
extraction of their primary export and more submissive to international pressure 
(Lombardi, 2003; see also Coronil, 1997).  Although Lombardi has noted that Venezuela 
did not garner much attention from the international community before oil, Ewell’s 
(1996) documentation of correspondence between the U.S. and Venezuelan governments 
between 1897 and 1908 points to a few conflicts that engaged both governments.  These 
incidents invoked a high level of editorializing from The New York Times.   
As the dictator Cipriano Castro held power in Venezuela from 1899 to 1908, the 
U.S. experienced a rise of sporadic anti-Americanism from Venezuela.  Castro’s defiance 
of the wishes of U.S. interests earned him the description by Theodore Roosevelt as “an 
unspeakably villainous little monkey” (quoted in Ewell, 1996, p. 99).  In particular, 
Castro had challenged the property claims of the New York & Bermuda Asphalt 
Company, accused various U.S. investors of treasonous collusion in Venezuelan politics, 
and failed to pay on Venezuela’s debt to European nations, resulting in a blockade of the 
Venezuelan coasts, the threat of war and the depression of U.S. trade in the area (Ewell, 
1996). 
Cold War Era 
This period includes the transitional years from dictatorship to democracy in 
Venezuela.  In 1958, the nation’s right-wing military forces were permanently replaced 
by constitutional democracy, Rómulo Betancourt, previously exiled and living in the 
U.S., was elected president.  In response to the previous era of military rule and a failed 
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democratic experiment from1945 to 1948, the emerging parties after the 1958 election 
devised the Pact of Punto Fijo in order to diffuse the Communist left and ensure the 
order and stability that would obviate military intervention by the Venezuelan right 
(Adelman, 2002).  Kenneth Roberts has argued that the main left-democratic party of 
Betancourt, the Acción Democrática (AD), moderated its stance and negotiated social, 
political and economic pacts to assuage Venezuela’s elite distrust of social reforms and 
protect the property rights of business.  Given the political collusion and class 
compromise that resulted from high oil rents, elections became non-ideological and non-
programmatic and class cleavage eroded (Roberts, 2003).   
According to political scientist Daniel Hellinger (2003), the success of the Punto 
Fijo project derived from a mutually beneficial relationship with the post-World War II 
U.S. international hegemony.  Betancourt garnered the support and approval of U.S. 
leaders, such as Nelson Rockefeller, and Venezuela became the democratic model held 
up against Cuban-style revolution.  “That is,” Hellinger has written, “the minimalist 
democracy established by the Pact of Punto Fijo was a polyarchy, a form of weak 
democracy preferred by the U.S. elites to more radical, participatory, egalitarian 
regimes” (2003, p. 27).  For example, Hellinger pointed out, Betancourt’s version of 
Venezuelan sovereignty never entertained the possibility of state ownership of foreign 
companies, most significantly in the oil industry. 
Although champions of Venezuelan democracy celebrated what they saw as a 
stable, experienced, middle-class, disciplined democratic practice, by the 1990s the 
political system attained a widespread reputation as a corrupt, mismanaged and 
inefficient “partyarchy” (Ellner, 2003).  This study looks at the editorials in The New 
York Times from 1958 to 1968 in order to capture the newspaper’s understanding of the 
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emergence of democracy in Venezuela.  After 1968, the Times apparently did not publish 
another editorial on Venezuela until 1975. 
Current Era 
From 1958 until 1998, power oscillated between two government parties now 
widely acknowledged as corrupt and negligent of Venezuela’s poor (Coppedge, 1994; 
Hillman, 1994).  After forty years of democracy and oil wealth, the majority of the 
population remained in poverty with limited access to basic needs, such as water, 
sanitation, and medical care (Marquez, 2003), and workers found themselves facing 
decreased health and real wages and an increased informal sector (Lalander, 1998).  In 
the early 1990s, revolts against capitulation to neoliberal economic policy became 
widespread, including riots in 1989 and a failed coup attempt in 1992, led by an army 
lieutenant-colonel named Hugo Chávez.  In 1998, the president was formally indicted on 
corruption charges, and Chávez was elected as president by a large majority.  Since then, 
the outspoken leftist populist was re-elected in 2000, re-instated after a coup attempt in 
2002, and given a sixty percent vote of confidence in a highly controversial referendum 
held in 2004 (Gott, 2005).  On December 3, 2006, Chávez was re-elected again as 
president by the same sixty-percent majority that has consistently supported him. 
The general political situation in Venezuela since the late 1980s has been one of 
extreme polarization and heightening tension as a large poor majority now maintains 
control of the government in opposition to a smaller but well-organized union of the 
business and middle classes (Ellner, 2003).  As Ellner (2003) has stated, this “social 
polarization in Venezuela is more pronounced than ever, reflecting recent trends 
throughout the third world” (p. 24).  Recently, other Latin American populations have 
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grown discontent with U.S.-oriented free trade policies and are electing more leftist and 
socialist leaders, as in Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, and Uruguay.   
Nationalism and the News 
 The relationship between the nation-state and mass media has been of central 
theoretical concern in communications studies.  Benedict Anderson’s (1991) well-known 
concept of the nation as an “imagined community” posited the mass media – particularly 
the newspaper, the novel, and print-capitalism in general – as a primary actor in this 
imagining.  Jürgen Habermas (1989) famously argued that the institutional development 
of mass media and the state, at least in the Western world, has been inextricable and 
mutually constitutive.  Michael Schudson (1994) has also reiterated the role of 
imagination in non-interpersonal communication: “All societies are fictive.  Personal 
identification with any grouping of people beyond those one encounters face to face in 
daily life (and perhaps, even there, too) depends on an imaginative leap” (p. 24).   
The question of how this imagining works and with what results is often the focus 
of studies of national representations in the news.  The construction of nationality in 
media representations is the construction of bounded territoriality, of “Us” and “Them.”  
As Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2006) have argued: “Such cumulative media representations 
provide individuals with a version of what their societies look like as a whole, imparting a 
seemingly natural sense of how society ‘is’ and how one is located within it” (p. 106).  
These representations of “place” in the social construct of nationality influence 
individual and social knowledges of national identity and international, or intercultural, 
relationships (Drzewiecka, 2003).  In turn, these knowledges “allow for the fabrication, 
rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside 
accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation, 
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power and authority, and political affiliation” (Zelizer, quoted in Le, 2006, p. 709).  
Zelizer’s work has shown that the way journalists represent the past has relevance to how 
we imagine the present and future.  Le (2006) has argued that the representations of 
national identities are often a “prisoner of the past,” meaning past imaginations or 
ideologies, and in being so can hinder new understandings of intercultural relations.   
Le has also argued for the relevance of editorials in studying national 
representations in the news:  
Editorials are short pieces of argumentative writing that directly reflect a 
newspaper’s position on an issue it deems important.  In this respect, editorials 
differ from articles that are supposed to present current news in an objective 
manner.  Thus, editorials can be considered as significant manifestations of the 
concept of “news framing”….The discourse analysis of editorials on a specific 
issue…provides an interpretive framework for the newspaper’s global coverage on 
that issue. (p. 711) 
 
This study positions editorials in much the same way, arguing that the editorials 
represent the manifested worldviews and ideologies of the more powerful figures in the 
most prestigious source of international news.  These worldviews arguably provide the 
ideological framework for the newspaper’s international reporting in general. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
International News in the U.S. 
Previous studies of U.S. coverage of Latin America have pointed to the 
overabundance of negativity, violence and destruction (Rosenblum, 1979); the lack of 
depth and complexity (Carragee, 2003); the overemphasis of U.S. political and economic 
interests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988); and the reliance on government officials as 
sources (Sigal, 1973).  Many critics contend that these practices define international 
issues in the interest of U.S. elites, ignoring alternative explanations.  Paletz and Entman 
(1981) asserted that “on foreign policy, the mass media tend to…limit rather than expand 
public knowledge of alternative possibilities,” in effect becoming “conduits of elites’ 
visions of America’s overseas interests” (p. 215).   
 Larson, McAnany, and Storey (1986) have described a decade’s worth of network 
news coverage of the region as ad hoc caricatures of crisis situations as reported through 
a Cold War lens by Washington sources and lacking any sense of ongoing development 
and explanation.  The authors noted: “The sense of caricature presented by…television 
news is disturbing, especially if we make two assumptions: first, that Latin America is an 
area of significant policy interest to the U.S. and second, that an informed public is an 
important element in the policymaking process” (p. 182).  When coverage focuses on 
crisis situations and privileges official sources, the resultant frames tend to resemble the 
official U.S. policy line and to neglect alternative explanations that warrant public 
consideration. 
Herman (1985) found this effect when he analyzed The New York Times’ 
coverage of the 1984 presidential elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua.  These two 
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elections occurred under very similar circumstances, but his analysis of the coverage 
found that the ideological frames present were markedly different from each other, 
resembling the positions of the White House.  The same issues, such as human rights 
and electoral procedures, were highlighted in one case and downplayed in the other, in 
line with official U.S. policy toward that nation.  Also, Herman noted that The New York 
Times was eerily silent on issues of concern against U.S. policy.  Quantifying the 
frequency of ideological elements in the news stories, Herman concluded that, on foreign 
policy issues, a “propaganda framework” allows the government to produce news that a 
normally cooperative mass media will disseminate. 
 This harsh criticism may be well deserved in many instances, but what about 
when the press does question Washington policy?  Hallin (1986) has pointed out that 
The New York Times’ coverage of Central American civil wars in the 1980s was often 
critical of U.S. policy goals as well as Cold War assumptions that in earlier years were 
taken for granted.  The emergence of criticisms of U.S. policy in this era seemed to show 
The New York Times’ dedication to objectivity and ability to criticize the elite position.  
Hallin maintained, however, that the press’ “coming of age” in the Watergate and 
Vietnam era was synchronous with a breakdown of consensus among elites in general.  
Division among elites “triggered a different mode of reporting” that targeted specific 
elites within a “sphere of legitimate controversy” (p. 10).   
He explained how this seemingly antagonistic coverage of elites maintained 
valuable ideologies in the tumultuous times surrounding the Vietnam War.  In this era, 
the news media allowed dissenting elites to frame the boundary of legitimate debate 
around tactics and mistakes in war plans, but they did not entertain the oppositional 
frame that much of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia at that time was illegal and 
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inhumane.  Such coverage may appear antagonistic toward White House policy, but it 
fails to criticize the control the U.S. exercises over international politics.  That the U.S. 
should control international politics is not a natural proposition, but is rather an 
assumption of an ethnocentric geopolitical frame derived from the viewpoint of elite U.S. 
sources.  Bennett (1990) has termed this phenomenon “indexing,” arguing that “mass 
media professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices 
and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in 
mainstream government debate about a given topic” (p. 106).  The range varies 
according to issue, with division among elites producing a broader range of views in the 
news and consensus a more narrow range – which is more often the case concerning 
foreign policy.   
  Carragee (2003) has maintained a similar argument in his qualitative study of 
The New York Times’ coverage of the end of the Cold War.  He argued that the 
challenges to Central American policy in the 1980s that Hallin identified in news 
coverage represent a “high-water mark of the American news media’s challenge to the 
political orthodoxy associated with the Cold War” (p. 304).  In contrast, Carragee argued, 
as the Berlin Wall gave way to the development promises of the 1990s, The New York 
Times was still emphasizing looming crises, elite consensus, the need for skilled 
management of world affairs by the U.S., and disparagement of opposition movements 
to U.S. policy.  Bennett (1990) had found that when there was debate among elites 
concerning Nicaragua in the 1980s, The New York Times discussed multiple views and 
even turned to nonofficial sources for information.  By 1986, however, Reagan had 
garnered support from Congress and opposition views all but disappeared in The New 
York Times.   
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 Collectively, studies on coverage of Latin America in the U.S. do not bode well for 
the democratic function of the press in foreign policy toward the region.  Paletz and 
Entman (1981) have attempted to explain this connection, claiming that the coverage 
described above can contribute to a “renascent hawkishness” in defense spending and 
corporate lobbying efforts.  They argued that the stereotype of violent, strife-ridden and 
undesirable life in less industrialized countries and the lack of viable foreign alternatives 
to the U.S. system are elements of “a stream of events and messages” (p. 229).  This 
stream affects public opinion of these nations and our economic and military policies 
toward them “where public and official unfamiliarity with the countries leads them to 
rely most heavily on media accounts” (p. 221). 
Given that these criticisms of U.S. international coverage span the last three 
decades, and that the current framing of Venezuelan politics, as noted above, does not 
show much evidence of change in response to such criticism, a deeper ideological 
analysis is called for.  I attempt such an analysis here, investigating the Venezuelan 
context and drawing on critical and cultural theories of discourse in order to further 
analyze the roles that the U.S. mainstream media play in these international relations.  
Postcolonial analysis, one of the more powerful recent methods in critical theory, 
changes our camera angle, so to speak, positioning us from the points of view of the so-
called “Third World” so that we may more clearly assess the Western ideologies of 
modernization so taken for granted in the U.S. 
Postcolonial Social Theory 
 Postcolonialism, rooted in the fields of literature and anthropology, critically 
assesses the limits of the project of European modernity (see, for example Bhabha, 1994; 
Chakrabarty, 2000; Said, 1978; and Spivak, 1987).  Faced with the realities of 
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colonialism and its continuing effects, the universalism of reason, democracy, autonomy, 
equality and civil society has been shown to be social, rather than “natural,” law.  These 
values, which Europe and the U.S. define and then assume to be universally desirable, 
appear in the light of colonial history as vested interests.  From rationalizing slavery and 
the appropriation of natural resources as a “civilizing mission,” to insisting on neoliberal 
economic policies as the path to equality, freedom and modernization, the values of 
modernity often function in the so-called “Third World” as boundaries and limitations 
that further inequality and prevent justice.   
The key to postcolonial analysis is a focus on the production of historical and 
geographical knowledges.  How did these Eurocentric values come to be institutionalized 
as knowledge?  How are they reproduced and challenged over time?  What role do they 
play in the contemporary global situation of inequality between the so-called First and 
Third Worlds?  Edward Said initiated this critical work with his seminal book 
Orientalism, published in 1978, which argued that the vivid descriptions of the exotic 
Orient found in colonial-era anthropology and literature helped shape the Western view 
of the world on a racialized, hierarchical basis.  This basis, argued Said and later 
postcolonials, was used to interpret and justify colonialism and imperialism as necessary 
to the “civilizing mission” of instilling the world’s barbarians with the values of reason, 
order, and commerce, among others (Iskandar, 2005; Patke, 2006).  This academic and 
literary knowledge production of colonialism as a civilizing mission is inextricably 
implicated in the history of empire.   
The history of colonialism and empire is a history that is not assumed by 
postcolonial theorists to exist solely in the past, but rather as operating, albeit in some 
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different manifestations, in today’s context of globalization and modernity.  The term 
“postcolonial,” Patke (2006) has claimed: 
implies awareness of the ways in which modes of thought and belief learned 
through colonial history continue to affect cultures after the formal collapse of 
empires.  It turns to cultural productions and practices for an imprint of, and a 
reaction to, the residual force of colonialism on societies whose contemporary 
history is shaped by asymmetrical patterns of modernization, industrialization 
and globalization. (p. 370) 
 
The political project of postcolonialism is to uncover and practice new ways of knowing 
that were supposed to have been eradicated by colonialism and the civilizing project of 
modernity: “The driving force of postcolonial work” according to Shome and Hedge 
(2002) “is to interrogate the universalizing discourse of Western modernity” (p. 262).   
This role of discourse is what connects communication studies to postcolonial 
theory, although “journalism, mass communication, and rhetorical studies have been 
slow to recognize the analytical possibilities” this work offers (Parameswaran, 2002, p. 
288).  In a special issue of Communication Theory, communication scholars such as 
Raka Shome, Radha Hedge and Lawrence Grossberg called for further integration of this 
approach into the discipline.  According to Parameswaran in the same issue, the 
combination of semiotic, feminist and Marxist textual analysis with postcolonial 
vocabularies can be applied to journalism “to empower media scholars to disrupt the 
hegemony of dominant discourses that shape conversations over key cultural and 
economic developments in the global public sphere” (2002, p. 312).  Her critique of 
National Geographic’s portrayal of globalization provides an excellent example of how 
the postcolonial approach can add conceptual depth of history and globalization to 
critiques of race and gender.   
Before delving into a review of this work in the field of journalism, some 
fundamental terms relevant to postcolonial theory should be elaborated and discussed – 
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although it should be kept in mind that, by the nature of this theoretical body of work, 
these terms overlap and evade strict definition, as they are useful only insofar as they 
apply to any given context.  Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of terms 
draws from Robert Young’s (2001) erudite analysis of the world’s anti-colonial 
movements and the accompanying theories in Postcolonialism: An historical 
introduction. 
Third World 
The hierarchical nature of the term “Third World” has been criticized for its 
subordinate relation to the First and Second Worlds, as well as for its loaded 
implications of debt, famine, poverty, conflict and strife.  Likewise, the term “the (global) 
South” is disputed for its homogenization of so many classes, countries and peoples, and 
“the non-West” for its negative definition and its implication of a clean dichotomy.  
Instead, Young has proposed using such terms as “the three continents” or 
“tricontinentalism” in order to highlight the heterogeneity, vastness and solidarity that 
apply to the histories of Africa, Asia and Latin America.  These terms – endorsed by 
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America at Havana in 
1966 – will be used as appropriate in this thesis to reference what is more commonly 
known as the “Third World.” 
Colonialism 
Whereas imperialism is more of an ideological concept of a global political 
system, colonialism is more of a localized practice. Colonialism refers to the various ways 
of implementing such an imperial system, such as Spanish conquest, British direct or 
indirect rule, or French assimilation, in all its different contexts: the Amazon, North 
America, India, Algeria, the Middle East, the Congo, Australia, etc.  An important 
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distinction resides between settlement and exploitive colonization.  Often settlers are 
conceived as both colonizers and colonized, but the indigenous peoples and imported 
slaves do not generally occupy this ambiguous identity.  On the one hand, settler 
colonialism has often played a predominant role in population control – exporting 
political undesirables, establishing new colonies for trade, releasing economic tension – 
for “mother” countries.  Exploitation colonialism, on the other hand, played a more 
direct role in the desire for riches, commercial profit, and international power plays.   
Initially, according to Young, colonization was economically driven.  Capitalism 
and its modes of production and trade were used to transform indigenous economies, 
often enforced by militarized occupation.  With the exception of Latin America and other 
plantation economies, Europeans did not initially attempt to transpose cultural values 
onto the indigenous or justify their actions with ideological rationales.  “Colonization was 
not primarily concerned with transposing cultural values.  They came as a by-product of 
its real objectives of trade, economic exploitation and settlement” (Young, 2001, p. 24).  
The central role that colonialism plays in postcolonial analysis is due to the connection of 
the global historical with the global present – a connection most recognizable as the 
universalization of the western linear model of technological progress, development and 
power. 
Imperialism 
Whereas colonialism operated with economic, practical and utilitarian motives, 
imperialism constituted the ideological work that became necessary to support such 
systems.  Imperialism gave “cultural meaning to the historical practice of colonialism,” 
and due to its nature as an ideological force, imperialism at times can even include a 
sense of paranoia that may work against economic or pragmatic interests (Young, 2001, 
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p. 28).  “Imperialism is characterized by the exercise of power either through direct 
conquest or through political and economic influence that effectively amounts to a 
similar form of domination; both involve the practice of power through facilitating 
institutions and ideologies” (ibid, p. 27).  These “facilitating institutions and ideologies” 
are the hegemonic crux of the global political system that results from the era of high 
imperialism and colonialism at the end of the nineteenth century – they constitute both 
the source of power and targets for resistance.   
French imperialism was based on the concept of missiòn civilisatrice, or 
civilizing mission, which was derived from Enlightenment philosophies of equality, 
fraternity, and liberty of humankind.  In comparison to other empires, French colonies 
offered the “best” educational and cultural facilities to many of their colonized subjects 
but demanded renunciation of other cultures and religions.  They believed that other 
races could be “improved.”  According to Young, this form of imperialism constitutes a 
“paradox of ethnocentric egalitarianism,” or, in other words, a progressive notion of the 
fundamental equality of humanness that was the least essentializing or racist of the 
imperial ideologies but most culturally oppressive in its profound disdain for other 
cultures, languages and religions.   
British imperialism, by contrast, was an ideology of association, non-interference, 
and outright rejection of the French approach to assimilation.  Although this form of 
imperialism today appears more liberal and less culturally oppressive (almost 
multiculturalist), it was paradoxically based on the most racialized or essentialist 
hierarchy of culture, and opposed the “mixing” of races and cultures.  After the war with 
North American colonies in 1776 (producing a federated system of free trade and self-
government among Anglo-Saxon settler colonies) and the 1857 “mutiny” in India (ending 
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progressive reform policies and instituting more oppressive centralized control of 
dependent colonies), the British system became explicitly two-fold according to race.  
This distinction heightened anti-colonial movements within the dependent, or exploited, 
colonies that demanded treatment equal to the liberal autonomy of the white settler 
colonies.  Rather than openly admit the contradictions of a racialized hierarchy of 
colonies, a “racialized time scale” became the ideological rationale for trusteeship of 
exploited colonies.  “Imperial duty was now double: first to exploit for the benefit of 
others (‘the civilized world’) the availability of raw materials that would otherwise be left 
unused, and then to extend the culture of civilization to the society being exploited” 
(Young, 2001, p. 40).  This system was legitimated for a time through the use of 
propaganda and appeals to patriotic pride in the empire.   
At the end of the nineteenth century, however, a new imperialism emerged, with 
aspects of both the French and British ideologies, which became conceived of as 
American.  Under sustained liberal (economic) and Marxist critiques of colonialism, the 
imperial system shifted from direct conquest to economic domination.  As colonies 
began to win their independence, new forms of economic domination by the ambivalent 
colonized/colonizing U.S. took hold hegemonically. 
Neocolonialism 
Lest we imagine that the concepts of neocolonialism and economic domination 
stretch the definition of colonialism too far, we should not forget that the United States 
is, in fact, a colonial power in the Old-World sense: Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, and various Pacific islands remain colonized territories under U.S. control; 
indigenous peoples in the U.S, including in Alaska and Hawaii, continue to contest 
annexation; and an emerging concept in the mainstream immigration debate in the U.S. 
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is captured with the Latino/a slogan “We didn’t cross the border; the border crossed us.”  
Given this lingering evidence, there are nevertheless distinct qualities of the new 
imperialism, hence the term neocolonialism. 
Young has described neocolonialism as “a continuing economic hegemony that 
means that the postcolonial state remains in a situation of dependence on its former 
masters, and that the former masters continue to act in a colonialist manner towards 
formerly colonized states” (p. 45).  In a shift from physical to ideological control, the elite 
in newly independent states take on a hegemonic role in the interest of international 
capital.  This role is often supplemented by the policing powers of external military 
invasion, of internal use of army and police, and of world financial organizations.  A 
“colonialist manner” may seem an abstract idea, but in the concrete, as Young and others 
have described, it appears quite familiar as: a) economic and political policy, as well as 
technology, directed from outside; b) military aid that increases dependency; c) cheap 
labor that joins raw materials as an economic resource, requiring political stability, 
infrastructure and a trained work force; d) imperial-funded non-governmental 
organizations; e) “unveiling” women and secularizing religion; f) exporting unhealthy or 
harmful products and waste to “weaker” nations; and g) an imbalance of resource 
consumption.   
A characteristic of this list that stands out is the interconnectedness of imposed 
policy and humanitarianism.  The latter, although not innately malignant, often serves 
hegemonically in support of the former; its ambivalent lineage dates back to the 
civilizing mission of French imperialism.  This last point helps to illuminate, for the 
analysis below, the shifting and contradictory nature of neocolonialism, modernization 
and humanitarianism.  Careful discourse analysis can identify hegemonic co-optation of 
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humanitarian sympathies as well as moments of resistance and solidarity by holding 
rhetoric up in the light of historically colonial discourse. 
Finally, one major problem with the neocolonialism critique – and its theoretical 
cousin, dependency theory – is that it does not conceptualize resistance and change: “As 
a concept, neocolonialism is as disempowering as the conditions it portrays.  Removal of 
the possibilities of agency is equally a problem of more recent theories of power 
operating through economic exploitation” (Young, 2001, p. 49).  A complex critique of 
globalization and modernity discourses would analyze resistant forces and change over 
time as well as the political realities of dominance and continuity through time in order 
to better understand the world, how it came to us, and how we represent it. 
Journalism and Colonial Discourse 
As noted above, Edward Said is responsible for bridging the political 
commitments and ideological critiques of the anti-colonial movements with structuralist 
and poststructuralist theories of knowledge as epistemic violence, “moving the analysis 
of colonialism, imperialism and the struggles against it to the question of discourse” 
(Young, 2001, p. 384).  Said argued that Orientalist discourse produces a dichotomy that 
represents the East as voiceless, sensual, feminine, despotic, irrational, exotic, barbarian 
and uncivilized; the West as masculine, democratic, rational, moral, dynamic and 
progressive (Said, 1978).  These consistent representations throughout colonialist 
discourse remain the basis of our knowledge about the world outside Euroamerica, 
knowledge that is relied on in constructing international relations and policy.  Since 
Orientalism, many academic fields have looked to colonial discourse to analyze how 
knowledge is (re)produced and how knowledge-producing institutions are implicated in 
colonialism and its continuing effects.  Studies of journalism have recently taken up this 
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form of analysis, in extension of research questioning journalism’s role in power, 
ideology and foreign policy. 
Ilia Rodríguez (1998) has looked at news reporting during the Spanish-American 
war of 1898 in order to analyze representations of Puerto Ricans as the U.S. assumed 
control over the colony.  Popularly known as an era of “yellow journalism,” this period of 
reporting has been criticized for its “rally-round-the-flag,” or jingoistic sensationalism of 
the war.  Rodríguez, however, applied the concept of colonial discourse analysis in order 
to interpret how issues of race, colonization, imperialism, and economic progress were 
incorporated into policy through a public discourse that emerged to justify conquering 
and continual colonial administration of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines 
by the U.S.  Journalism and mass media, she argued, are “key practices and institutions 
whereby the production of a discourse about the colonized is controlled, selected and 
organized” (p. 284).   
Using David Spurr’s (1993) analytical model of the main features of colonial 
discourse (see below), Rodríguez determined four complementary rhetorical modes in 
the reporting: 1) affirmation of the U.S. as morally, technologically and economically 
superior; 2) surveillance of the island’s infrastructure, strategic location and natural 
resources without regard to local perspectives; 3) classification of categories of natives to 
correspond with different administrative tactics; 4) debasement of indigenous peoples as 
mobs, savage, lazy, backward, etc.  Rodríguez concluded that “U.S. press coverage of the 
Spanish-American war was more than propaganda or sensationalist and jingoistic 
reporting.  News reporting was also a form of discourse that, in a colonizing gesture, 
inscribed an identity for the colonized, and provided justification for the colonial 
administration of Puerto Rico by the United States” (1998, p. 299).  This notion of 
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identity and representation of the Other, combined with extensive historical context of 
the economic, political and ideological interests involved, is the mark of this emerging 
analysis of the ideological role of journalism. 
Olga Bailey (2005) has focused on the significance of identity-making in 
journalism, incorporating Derrida’s concept of “violence of the letter” that one culture 
imposes on another in the naming, classifying, differentiating and interpellating work 
that writing performs.  “The very process,” she argued, “by which one culture 
subordinates another begins in the act of naming and leaving unnamed, of marking on 
an unknown territory the lines of division and uniformity, of boundary and continuity” 
(2005, p.1).  Journalism often acts as part of this process as a “popularizer of the 
ideology of modernism,” industrialization, and imperial expansion.  A politics of naming 
in journalism refers to the construction of a preferred view of reality that is embedded 
with ideological content that superficially appears natural.  Bailey’s analysis of British 
media after the September 11 events has highlighted the subsequent reaction to asylum 
seekers and immigrants as defining and naming them as the “Other” and dichotomizing 
“us versus them.”  This is a historically colonial form of discourse that defines the Other 
as non-western, on the fringe of geopolitics, and a savage whose lack of civilized virtue 
invites threat, hostility and antagonism.  “The residual aspects of a colonial discourse 
seem to have survived beyond the classic colonial era and continue to colour perceptions 
of the non-western world through the politics of naming thus establishing the ideological 
difference from the West” (p. 3). 
Landers (2006) has looked at the colonial discourse itself, analyzing the 
discourse in three quality monthly magazines at the turn of the century.  As the U.S. 
debated assuming an “island empire” from the Spanish in the 1890s, the expansionist 
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and anti-imperialist arguments were captured and, to different degrees, legitimated in 
the journalism of Century, Cosmopolitan, and McClure’s.  Whereas expansion across the 
American continent previous to the 1898 war was compatible with ideals of 
republicanism that linked individual liberty with agrarian society and the availability of 
land, the accession of the “island empire” suddenly positioned the U.S. as an imperialist 
nation.  The new rationale that developed in the debate on expansion was “one based on 
an amalgam of national sense of mission, Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and Social 
Darwinism among nations” (p. 96).  Although the era’s reporting documented resistant 
arguments from anti-imperialists, they were commonly portrayed as idealists: 
“Newspapers responded with articles and editorials that tended to promote nationalism 
and economic self-interest at the expense of idealism” (p. 96).   
One theme that runs through these studies of colonial discourse in journalism is 
an ever-increasing and complex understanding of the historical and material 
circumstances surrounding a particular issue.  These analyses are not merely rhetorical 
or linguistic, but also contextual.  For example, part of Landers’ discussion includes the 
transformation from an agrarian to industrial economy and the resulting labor 
radicalism and social unrest that was taking place in the U.S. at the time.  Gilded Age 
extravagance and abject poverty were also key factors in the path that imperialist 
discourse assumed.  Expansionism could deflect unrest at home.  These historical 
analyses are important to understanding how public discourse is constructed and why 
certain frames and representations “win out” over others.   
A. Lazar and M. M. Lazar (2004) have described this necessary contextualization 
as “politico-historical conditions that have made the articulation and elaboration of this 
particular set of statements possible” (p. 225).  In their analysis of discourse at the end of 
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the Cold War, they pointed to contextual factors such as the determination of the U.S. to 
remain a superpower after the threat of the Soviet Union was dissolved and the 
commercial competition from Europe and Japan appeared on the wane.  This 
determination produced the need to articulate new threats and the relevance of U.S. 
world leadership that continued to position the U.S. in control.  “One such approach was 
the geo-strategic model, which emphasized both American military leadership in 
countering global aggression and the maintenance of a liberal-democratic 
internationalism” (p. 225).  In addition to articulation, this modified worldview needed 
to be legitimated and performed periodically (thus the role of the news media).   
Four elements of the statements on moral order in the post-Cold War world 
include defining the moral order, belonging to it, leading it, and defending it.  Lazar and 
Lazar, drawing from Foucault’s work on discourse, analyzed the element of definition: 
“The public moral order is built up normatively vis-à-vis the articulation of the aberrant 
‘other’ or ‘threat’ which, at the same time, justifies the identification, division and 
excision of that threat” (p. 227).  In the post-Cold War, the authors asked how Saddam 
Hussein and Osama bin Laden had been articulated and constructed as enemy threats to 
moral order.  The authors labeled this process of identity-making “outcasting,” which 
includes rhetorical modes of enemy construction, criminalization, orientalization and 
(e)vilification.  This last mode, the authors argued, is an emergent one in the post-Cold 
War world, pointing to a more clear and systematic enunciation of the spiritual or 
religious element in outcasting.  This development in the rhetoric of justification possibly 
fills a vacuum left by the ideological battle between capitalism (good) and communism 
(evil).  Combining this rhetorical analysis of knowledge-making with a material analysis 
of vested interests constitutes the lens of colonial discourse analysis.  In terms of 
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Venezuela, Lazar and Lazar’s study can illuminate the process of friend- and enemy-
construction that establishes an identity of Venezuelans in U.S. public discourse and, in 
part, determines our interaction with them. 
Isabel Molina-Guzmán (2003) has questioned the ideological location of 
Latinos/as in U.S. popular imagination by analyzing journalism’s role in maintaining 
“the symbolic borders of the imagined nation during a time of increased cultural flux” (p. 
2).  Her analysis of television news coverage of the Elián González controversy unpacked 
the familiar narratives of a clearly dichotomized race or ethnicity that were employed 
regardless of the ambiguous and hybridized identity of Cuban-Americans.  “How do 
journalists,” she asked, “as national storytellers, write about a group whose growing 
numbers and physical hybridity threaten to re-define dominant binary hierarchies” (p. 
5)?  She identified various colonialist rhetorical modes in the coverage that worked 
together to deny legitimacy to Cuban-Americans as a hybrid culture and subordinate 
Latino/as in general to a dominant culture of civilized whiteness.  A “trope of 
tropicalism,” whose lineage dates back to anthropological writings of the colonialist era, 
is often applied to Latin American and U.S. Latino/a cultures through mentions of brown 
or olive skin, religiosity, emotionality, and metaphors of heat.  In the debate over Elían 
Gonzáles’ place in the world, Cuban-Americans were consistently represented as volatile, 
emotional, hotheaded, lawless, zealous with prayer and tears, and generally outside the 
borders of social and institutional acceptability.  
 By contrast, “experts, government sources and journalists through their 
performance of whiteness become the background against which the Latino Other is 
contrasted and ultimately judged” (p. 15).  Sentiments of political activists and 
passionate supporters were counter-acted by authoritative legal and business discourse.  
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Institutional authority was represented as standing firm, giving stern warnings, and 
telling people to calm down; an infantilized community is seen and not heard, in contrast 
to the paternalistic and patriarchal authority of U.S. institutions.  After all the 
journalistic commentary, Molina-Guzmán argues, the community is “left at odds with 
itself and with the U.S. population at large.  The dominant ideology of the institutional 
hegemony is recuperated through the symbolic colonization of the Cuban American 
community” (p. 18).  She concluded that these journalistic practices of symbolic 
colonization function as a consensus narrative and affirm the national boundaries that 
are defined by the values, ideology and performance of whiteness.   
Many of these more recent studies on colonial discourse in journalism refer to 
one work in particular that provides an excellent model for analysis.  David Spurr’s 
(1993) The Rhetoric of Empire focused specifically on the lineage from the 
anthropological and literary discourse such as identified by Said to contemporary and 
current journalism, analyzing “the survival of colonial discourse in the postcolonial era” 
(p. 61).  Journalism relies on the use of myth, symbol and metaphor, despite 
conventional expectations of objectively recording fact, and Spurr has identified twelve 
non-exclusive tropes in colonial-era travel writing that continue to manifest themselves 
in current journalism practices.  By positioning excerpts from late-nineteenth century 
imperialist writing next to examples from reports on Africa, Asia and Latin America in 
the 1980s, Spurr made a strong argument for the continuity of colonial thinking, writing, 
and policymaking on the three continents.  He cautioned, however, that “there is nothing 
especially conscious or intentional in their [the tropes] use; they are part of the 
landscape in which relations of power manifest themselves” (p. 3). 
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These ever-shifting relationships between writing, representation, knowledge, 
violence, power, resistance, and domination are obscure, undertheorized areas of 
journalism studies.  Colonial discourse analysis begins to unpack the lineage and uses of 
modern values, charting modernity through the three subordinate continents and 
offering Westerners a chance to comprehend our practices through this tricontinental 
perspective.  Spurr’s analysis has positioned the practice of journalism in this 
relationship between knowledge and power.  Drawing from Derrida, Spurr argued that 
there is a metaphorical relationship between the writer and the colonizer: “For the 
colonizer as for the writer, it becomes a question of establishing authority through the 
demarcation of identity and difference” (p. 7).  A rhetorical, rather than purely historical, 
analysis of colonialism attempts to describe how the power of ruling ideas hold sway 
even after the end of direct domination and continue to influence social reality.  
Colonialism was a specific historical mode of imperialism.  “In speaking of the discourse 
of colonialism, however, the distinction tends to collapse, since the basic principles of 
this discourse, rooted in the very foundations of Western culture, also constitute the 
discourse of imperialism.  Imperialism has survived the formal ending of colonial rule, 
but so has colonial discourse” (p. 5).  This approach allowed Spurr to draw similarities 
between the language/power of nineteenth century travel writers and that of reporters 
covering the economic conditions of Africa or wars and elections in Central America in 
the 1980s.   
Finally, there is an inherent instability in colonial discourse that stems from its 
localization – its only real center of discourse being the maintenance of authority.  This 
center changes its vision over time and context:  
The intense and localized colonial administration of fifty years ago, for example, 
has shifted to a more indirect and global supervision of Third World political and 
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economic development.  Colonial discourse thus does not simply reproduce an 
ideology or a set of ideas that must constantly be repeated.  It is rather a way of 
creating and responding to reality that is infinitely adaptable in its function of 
preserving the basic structure of power. (p. 11) 
 
Spurr’s twelve tropes, each briefly described below, provide a means of tracking colonial 
discourse as it changes over time and context, in order to better identify hegemonic shifts 
in ideology and power. 
Surveillance 
Inspecting from a privileged position, the gaze is the “active instrument” of 
construction, destruction, order and arrangement.  Spurr has called this the 
“commanding view,” referring to the literal position – physically and institutionally – of 
nineteenth century travel writers’ top-of-the-hill perspective on the non-Western 
colonial world.  “The commanding view is an originating gesture of colonization itself, 
making possible the exploration and mapping of territory which serves as the 
preliminary to a colonial order” (p. 16).  Drawing on Foucault’s panopticon discussion, 
Spurr argued that this view engages in a “disproportionate economy of sight” that 
confers power on the journalist, placed above or at the center of events and yet apart 
from any indigenous system of values.  There is no position for an answering gaze of the 
Other.  The journalist’s selective process is tuned for scenes that carry an interest for 
Western audiences.  In the nineteenth century colonial world, the predominant interest 
was landscape, which was consistently aestheticized, invested with a destiny of material 
and symbolic richness, and subordinated to the authority of the writer/colonizer.  In a 
postcolonial environment, the commanding view still assumes the journalist’s authority 
over the scene, but the tone tends to be one of disappointment and disillusion rather 
than the earlier era’s optimistic free-for-all.   
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Although Spurr’s focus was on the continuity of colonial discourse through time, 
it is not a rigid structuralist approach to language.  His approach is capable of grasping 
the change that signals hegemonic shifts: “And we move,” he noted, “from robust 
nineteenth-century ideals of progress and civilization to a modernist sensibility that 
defines itself in terms of impotence, anxiety, and loss” (p. 23).  Both characterizations of 
the world place the Western system of values at the center, and the non-Western world 
as an object of study or a place in need of development and action.  
Appropriation 
The claiming of territory as the colonizer’s own also changes shape in the 
postcolonial world, while retaining its fundamental power.  The desire for colonial 
intervention has traditionally been placed onto the colonized object itself, whether that 
object be a natural resource that needs utilization or an indigenous people who need the 
restoration of order.  Ideologically, colonization becomes “a gesture of ‘human solidarity’ 
which unites the intellectual and moral qualities of Europe with the material wealth of 
the tropics” (p. 29).  Native peoples are gathered into the fold, morally improved and 
edified, embracing the institutions of their conquerors and thus protected.  What ends 
up being protected, however, is not the indigenous and their ways of life, but rather the 
new values they have embraced.  Via policing power, the indigenous are protected from 
themselves.  Materialistically, this amounted to the colonizer’s protection from resistance 
by the colonized.  “Colonial intervention thus responds to a threefold calling: that of 
nature, which calls for the wise use of its resources; that of humanity, which calls for 
universal betterment; and that of the colonized, who call for protection from their own 
ignorance and violence” (p. 34).   
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The end of direct domination heightens the need to find signs of sympathy and 
identification of non-Westerners to Western values, such as consumerist impulses, 
competition for development, or espousals of the principles of democracy.  This last 
form, Spurr argued, is most insidious as a colonialism of political theory presented as 
anti-colonialism.  Humanitarian claims to identify Jeffersonian principles in peoples that 
are unjustly oppressed by Western forces, such as in Vietnam or Iraq, simply remain 
what Derrida labels “ethnocentrism thinking itself as anti-ethnocentrism” (quoted in 
Spurr, p. 39).  The sympathies have shifted in these humanitarian outcries, but the 
rhetorical strategies of appropriation remain with us. 
Aestheticization 
Subjects are imagined to have inherent aesthetic qualities, such as the exotic, 
grotesque or elemental.  The suffering and chaos that seems so representative of the 
peoples of the three continents is often interpreted as resulting from a lack of law, reason 
and development; “hence the fascination with religious fanaticism, bloodthirsty 
dictators, and tribal atrocities” (p. 46).   In news reporting on foreign affairs, this trope 
can be seen in the productive tension between chaos and order as a script played out 
over and over, making social reality an “object of beauty, horror, pleasure, and pity” (p. 
59).  Spurr cautioned that this trope is ambiguous, as it can also be liberating when used 
in a manner that reevaluates the relation between cultures and suggests different ways of 
living and thinking. 
Classification 
This trope classifies indigenous peoples according to Western standards of 
political and technological development.  A powerful example of this trope is the 
classification of socialist, anti-colonial, or anti-imperial rhetoric as outdated or an 
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electoral grab for votes in tricontinental nations.  This trope employs a condescending 
tone and admonishment of alleged failures; a single standard of progress to measure all 
nations by; and a hierarchical and linear classification of nations according to their 
success or failure in meeting this standard.  All three are rooted in the social Darwinism 
of the Victorian era, extending into the language of colonial administration and the 
current ideology of modernization.  “Within the realm of discourse, classification 
performs this policing function, assigning positions, regulating groups, and enforcing 
boundaries” (p. 63).  Both authoritarian and humanitarian – even classical Marxist – 
discourse perform this knowledge/power of idealizing linear progress.  That 
modernization is desirable and beneficial continues to underlie the news media’s 
perception of history.   
Debasement 
This is the emphasis on the negative end of the Western value system.  Here, the 
base representations imposed upon an individual subject in need of civilized refinement 
is extended to the entire social system.  Repetition of undesirable characteristics serves 
to justify intervention as well as reiterate the fundamental distinction between colonizer 
and colonized.  This trope also includes the paradox of reviling others for their non-
Western ways, yet ridiculing those who attempt to imitate.  Lastly, the baseness 
projected onto the colonized subject produces a fear of contamination that includes 
biological, as well as social and psychological threats, such as the “dystopian view of vast 
social movements that threaten civilization itself” (p. 91). 
Negation 
The colonized are represented as an emptiness or nothingness waiting to be 
filled.  This negation presents an imperative for intervention, or rather justifies conquest 
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as non-conquest – if there is nothing there (laws, boundaries, sentiment) then filling the 
void is not conquest.  As is the case with other tropes, a more current modernist 
perspective displaces the opportunism of the colonial era with modern angst over the lost 
opportunity or impossibility.  The value of modernity itself remains unquestioned; in 
fact, it is the loss of that value that is mourned.  In the “absence of foreign investment, of 
social experimentation, and of strategic importance,” the three continents “remain 
nonetheless an empty space: not, this time, as the original void awaiting a fulfilling 
presence, but rather as a postcolonial waste land, the empty sign of unfulfilled desires” 
(p. 97). 
Affirmation 
Faced with the “nothingness,” the discourse of colonialism shows a tendency to 
idealize Western society as one of civilization, humanity, science and progress.  The mere 
affirmation of the existence of these ideals, located in Western society, generates power 
over that which is labeled non-Western.  This trope is familiar as the “White Man’s 
Burden,” which refers to the Westerner’s duty to civilize (modernize) the rest of the 
world.  Interestingly, this phrase was poeticized and popularized by Rudyard Kipling as 
the opportunity for an Anglo-Saxon imperial mission after the defeat of the Spanish by 
the U.S. in 1898.  “If we were to identify a characteristically American style of self-
affirmation,” Spurr claimed, “it would have to include the notions of material prosperity 
and moral progress granted by a somewhat secularized Providence, often embodied in 
Nature….For [Ralph Waldo] Emerson, moral and material progress are inseparably 
bound in the same evolutionary process” (p. 117).  In today’s world, this trope underlies 
the familiar American values of exporting democracy, investment, development, 
infrastructure, trade, and prompt and effective codes of law.  Unrest, chaos and anti-
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American rhetoric in the three continents are understood as people failing to understand 
the U.S.’s benevolent intentions to wean people from their self-destructive traditions and 
addictive reliance on the state.  This trope often takes the form of an analogy that blends 
maternal care and therapeutic metaphors. 
Idealization 
This trope captures the tradition of the “noble savage” in Western thought.  
During the era of high imperialism and colonialism at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Romanticism emerged as a vein of resistance to the rationalist and instrumentalist view 
of progress in the Western imagination.  Faced with this crass view of progress and its 
destructive force on non-Western social fabrics, this resistance compensated on a 
symbolic level “by representing individual instances of courage, beauty, and spiritual 
transcendence, Western writing about the Third World offers a kind of substitute 
gratification for what would otherwise be an overwhelming sense of loss” (p. 132).  In 
more recent reporting, Spurr has located the contemporary form in representations of 
poverty as “the way to human and spiritual fulfillment (p. 134), or debates over 
authenticity that distinguish between the idealized “bush-native” indigenous, the 
Westernized indigenous, and the European settler.  The limitation of these sympathies 
that defines them as part of colonial discourse is that they stop short of crossing cultural 
boundaries.  What ends up being idealized in colonial discourse is not an alternate 
symbolic universe – other ways of imagining life – but rather Western virtues.  This 
representation of the noble savage becomes a dialogue of the West with itself over its 
own contradictory values; the savage remains an instrument. 
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Insubstantialization 
The unfamiliar, ethereal, shimmering, overwhelming or dangerous qualities of 
the three continents for the Western travel writer or journalist transform the experience 
of the society into an inner journey of a psychological or spiritual quest for the writer.  
Yet again, the society and its people become a backdrop for a Western dialogue with 
itself.  “The specifically ideological nature of this sensibility [of the threat of madness] 
can be seen where the inner conflict of the subject displaces those conflicts taking place 
outwardly, in the actual arenas of human practice” (p. 148).  The strange or unreal 
aspects of the exterior world are projected internally as an unreality or instability of the 
writer’s own thoughts.  This unreal quality is then projected back onto the setting – 
stripping it of reality. 
Naturalization 
Nature is possibly one of the most ambivalent, multidimensional and 
contradictory concepts in the Western imagination.  “The concept of nature,” Spurr 
claimed, “stands for an empty space in the discourse, ready to be charged with any one of 
a number of values: nature as abundance, as absence, as original innocence, as unbridled 
destruction, as eternal cycle, as constant progression” (p. 168).  This floating signifier is 
also interchangeable with the three continents and their peoples in colonial discourse.  
Naturalizing the three continents places them in opposition to modernization, 
pragmatically granting dominion over the former by the latter.  Colonial discourse 
naturalizes in two ways, according to Spurr: it identifies colonized people as part of the 
natural world then presents this identification as a natural state of affairs.  In other 
words, it naturalizes the naturalization.  Previous journalism studies, as noted above, 
criticize the news media for representing the Third World as a place of human and 
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natural chaos and disaster.  Spurr’s analysis adds a historical and analytical depth to this 
criticism, tracing the lineage and vested interests back to colonialism as well as pointing 
out that the equation of socio-political unrest with natural disasters obscures this 
lineage, making political upheaval appear natural, cyclical, inevitable, rather than an 
effect of global human relationships of power that can be changed. 
Eroticization 
Spurr’s analysis of the feminization of colonized nations and peoples deals 
primarily with the concept of “unveiling,” which does not apply directly to the contexts of 
Latin America for the purposes of this study.  Two aspects of this trope, however, may 
prove illuminating in the following analysis.  First, Spurr has argued that the concept of 
unveiling “serves as a visual metaphor for ideas of opening and discovery everywhere 
made implicit in the discourse” (p. 175).  This sexualized metaphor applies to landscapes 
and nature as well.  Second, he identifies a rhetorical mode of serialization in colonial 
discourse that regulates populations, making them uniform, interchangeable and 
“deprived of a subjective personal identity” (p. 175).  These aspects reflect the complex 
historical intimacy between concepts of colonialism, gender, race, nature and power. 
Resistance 
Finally, Spurr identified the presence of resistance in the form of questioning the 
underlying assumptions of the colonizer’s discourse.  This trope is truly rare and difficult 
to differentiate from the humanitarian modes of thinking that fail to take a perspective of 
the colonized, as those discussed above.  Referring to Foucault’s concept of discourse as 
the juncture between knowledge and power, Spurr noted that for Foucault, this juncture 
is imperfect: “discourse can be not only an instrument or an effect of power, but also a 
point of resistance” (p. 184; emphasis in original).  Getting beyond colonial discourse 
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will require a constant attempt to understand the discursive structures of colonial power 
that underscore the positioning of power in today’s postcolonial world, as well as resist 
and reevaluate the values that contribute to oppression across the world.  Because 
colonial discourse is not a stable, unified structure, but rather shifts and modifies over 
time, resistance to colonial categories and viewpoints is always possible and happening.  
Spurr argued that this takes place in journalism when: a) ideological language is 
questioned from a non-Western point of view, such as the term “terrorism;” b) the 
conditions of observation that allow the journalist a particular vantage point are 
questioned; c) non-objectivity on the part of the journalist is acknowledged and 
discussed; and d) other voices and perspectives are present.  I hope to find such 
examples in its sample of U.S. discourse on Venezuela. 
In this analysis, I will apply postcolonial approaches to the U.S. political 
discourse on Venezuela in order to better understand “the ways in which the Western 
realities have spread across the world as the universal condition” (Shome & Hedge, 
2002, p. 261), particularly the realities of modernization, development and the nation-
state in a post-Cold war era.  As is hopefully clear by now, this study is not simply about 
what elites think about Venezuelan politics and presidents.  I hope to use the analytical 
tools described above to analyze how this particular communication maintains certain 
shared beliefs of our society as we continually define and shape the processes of 
globalization and development.  As Carey (1988) has argued, “social life is more than 
power and trade…it also includes the sharing of aesthetic experience, religious ideas, 
personal values and sentiments, and intellectual notions – a ritual order” (p. 34).  Rather 
than being imposed by force, consensus is often achieved through familiar narratives, 
metaphors and myths that, in Barthes’ (1957/1972) words, naturalize social norms as 
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common sense by “transforming history into nature” (p. 129).  In light of the 
contributions of postcolonial theorists, the role of the U.S. press in transforming colonial 
history into the natural progress of globalization deserves careful scrutiny. 
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METHOD 
 
Approaches to Discourse Analysis 
An increasingly common method of ideological analysis of mass media texts is 
called Critical Discourse Analysis, often abbreviated as CDA.  This method, derived from 
the field of linguistics, analyzes connections between discourse and hegemony that are 
reflective of and also influences social structures and power relationships (Fairclough, 
1989).  Unfortunately, the micro-linguistic analyses that often result from this method 
tend to lack substantial historical and material contextualization, assuming social 
practices rather than explaining the connection between the practices and the language 
(Fowler, 1996).  The end result too often resembles a list of grammatical and lexical 
features without an explanation of how their use interacts with social structures.   
Jones and Collins (2006) have provided an illuminating, if rather biting, critique 
of Critical Discourse Analysis, as embodied in the work of its leading practitioner, 
Norman Fairclough, comparing its potential with a more broad approach of political 
analysis.  Generally, the authors agree with Fairclough’s insistence that: a) linguistics is 
relevant to political and ideological critique; b) language is a primary medium for power; 
c) a dialectical relationship exists between discourse and social structures; and d) class 
struggle and Marxist theory is central to an understanding of this relationship.  They 
questioned, however, the rigidity of a structuralist approach such as CDA as well as its 
inability to incorporate various social theories and empirical facts into a complex process 
of generating new understandings about discourse and power.  Drawing out the 
implications of these limitations, Jones and Collins provided a tongue-in-cheek Critical 
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Discourse Analysis of one of Fairclough’s arguments, resulting in a list of linguistic 
features from the text that convey the exact opposite of Fairclough’s meaning.   
They concluded that “formal constructs of grammatical description are altogether 
unsuitable vehicles for the difficult intellectual labor of meaningful political critique” 
(Jones & Collins, 2006, p. 40).  CDA, or other structuralist linguistic approaches, loses 
its critical function because it ends up placing the action or responsibility on the 
language itself, rather than people, media ownership, political and economic allegiances, 
editorial and management practices, etc.  It is the analysis of practices, contexts, and 
histories that gives discourse analysis its critical substance, and Jones and Collins 
maintained that complex political analysis cannot, or should not, be avoided.  “The 
understanding and interpretation,” they argued, “of what the relevant or significant 
communicational forms, meanings, and patterns are in a particular situation or event is 
something that emerges in the course of detailed empirical investigation of the relevant 
event in all its complexity” (p. 42).   
It is the intention of my analysis of The New York Times editorials to engage in 
such a critique by focusing not simply on the language, but the discourse surrounding 
this context: the relationships between various Venezuelan and U.S. administrations, the 
relationships between Venezuela and other imperial powers, the relationships between 
the U.S. and the Old World empires, the relationships between humans and nature that 
make up so much of colonial history and the postcolonial situation.  All of this 
“everything else that is going on” (Jones & Collins, 2006, p. 47) is a necessary part of an 
analysis of the interactions between people, language, power and hegemony. 
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Selecting the Articles 
Scholars have previously asserted the influence of the news media, especially the 
prestige press, on U.S. foreign policy.  The press in this instance has a close and intricate 
relationship with political elites and policymakers (Cohen, 1963).  The New York Times 
is of particular significance to foreign policy as the newspaper is committed to 
international news, and its coverage is often used to inform members of Congress about 
the state of the world (Berry, 1990; Weiss, 1974).  The New York Times also has an 
influence on other new media’s coverage of foreign policy (Carragee, 2003).  The 
powerful influence of this coverage ultimately affects public opinion at large (McNelly & 
Izcaray, 1992; Salwen & Matera, 1989; Semetko, et al., 1992; Wanta & Hu, 1993; Wanta, 
et al., 2004).  Even if the readership of international news in The New York Times seems 
narrow, the effects can be widespread.  The editors’ opinions put forward by this 
newspaper largely reflect and legitimize the mainstream terms of public debate in the 
U.S. on matters of foreign policy.  Although this sample admittedly covers only the elite 
portion of the U.S. public sphere, it is this portion that remains so influential in setting 
the terms of public debate, especially over foreign policy.  Given this caveat, this sample 
provides fairly broad access to the range of discourse on the Venezuelan political 
situation across multiple media spheres. 
In this study, I will analyze editorials in The New York Times on the topic of 
Venezuela from 1897 to the present day in 2007.  The year 1897 captures the buildup to 
and debate over the Spanish-American war of 1898, when the U.S. joined the Old World 
as an overseas colonial power.  Eighteen-ninety-seven also marks a significant transition 
in U.S. journalism, when a choice crystallized between William Randolph Hearst’s 
activist, or “yellow,” journalism and the rise of The New York Times as the “moral 
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counterweight” of sober objectivity (Campbell, 2004).  The time frame of the next 110 
years provides ample historical space through which to chart the presence, absence and 
changes in colonial discourse in this prestigious U.S. newspaper.   
 In the interest of space, the sample focuses on three time periods throughout the 
century that generated the most discussion of Venezuela in the Times.  The “Colonial 
Era” covers 1897 through 1908, a period during which the U.S. decidedly replaced the 
European powers as the dominant force in the Latin American region.  The “Cold War 
Era” marks the transition in the world to a postcolonial, or neocolonial, order, covering 
1958 through 1968.  The “Current Era” includes the previous decade of socialist 
government in Venezuela, from 1998 to the present.  These 33 years represent 174 of the 
242 relevant articles (or roughly 70 percent) published during the previous 110 years.   
 The 242 editorials were accumulated in two searches.  First, I searched the 
“ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2003)” database for the 
term “Venezuela” and article type “Editorial.”  This produced 222 of the 242 relevant 
articles.  I then searched the Lexis-Nexis database for the years 2004 through 2007 for 
the terms “Venezuela” and “Editorial.”  This produced the remaining 20 editorials in the 
sample.  Afterwards, the sample was sized down to the above-mentioned 174 New York 
Times editorials. 
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ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION 
 
In these 174 editorials, I found strong evidence of continuity of colonial discourse 
throughout the century, as well as more subtle shifts in particular uses of some 
metaphors and tropes.  In general, the fundamental drama of Western civilization in its 
struggle against barbarity dominated The New York Times’ understanding of Venezuela 
throughout the century.  This ongoing battle of knowledge, technology, and moral 
prudence against the forces of primitivity, backwardness, and human nature defines the 
Western conception of the Self and the Other – of US and Them.  It is through the 
continual reproduction of these categories that the Times explained the international 
politics between Venezuela and the United States to its readers.   
Beyond this overarching narrative of Civilization (US) versus Barbarism (Them), 
Spurr’s (1993) tropes of colonial discourse proved analytically valuable in teasing out the 
finer manifestations of this understanding and its implications in the case of Venezuela.  
Of the twelve tropes of colonial discourse discussed above, eight were prominently 
represented in the editorials.  I argue here that evidence of the first tropes presented 
below – Surveillance, Appropriation, Aestheticization, and Classification – performed 
the discursive work of defining, assigning, setting the stage and categorizing that 
produces a part of the world (US) that has evolved into civilization and must lead the way 
for the rest (Them).  Subsequently, the remaining four tropes – Debasement, Negation, 
Affirmation and Naturalization – reinforced the vibrant characterizations that are critical 
to an understanding of the morality and inevitability of modernization as the triumph of 
good over evil.  As is the case with imperial ideologies, the end results materially and 
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culturally reside in the interests of maintaining Euroamerican dominance over the rest of 
the world.   
Examples of each trope and any supportive metaphors are analyzed below for 
each time period – Colonial, Cold War and Current.  The final subsection of the analysis 
addresses the potential for resistance against colonialist understandings in The New 
York Times, although as the evidence suggests, this resistance plays a minimal role in the 
general editorializing. 
Delineation Tropes 
In the context of Venezuela in the Times, the first four tropes, which I group as 
“delineation tropes,” position a politically and economically civilized United States as the 
promoter of reason, justice, law, impartiality, peace, prosperity, humanity and progress.  
Throughout each era, these assumptions about U.S. culture support arguments for 
intervention in Venezuela’s law and economy.  Due to the Times’ appropriation of these 
values for the U.S., intervention is always understood as benevolent, neutral and 
humanitarian, resembling earlier civilizing missions of French imperialism.  For the 
various editors throughout the century, the instruments and policies of free trade are 
unabashedly promoted as the tools with which the hemisphere can achieve the highest 
order of a fair civil society.   
Surveillance 
From a “commanding view,” the writer, journalist, or in this case the editorial 
board of the most prestigious international news source in the world, inspects, orders 
and arranges the world for their fellow readers and policymakers.  The broad 
descriptions of what is important, valuable and worthy – even what it is that is 
happening – is analogous to the exploration and mapping so vital to establishing the 
  53
colonial order.  The descriptions define without incorporating the “answering gaze” of 
the Other.  Ownership and authority is constructed and destructed by categorizing, 
drawing lines and defining.  The Colonial Era, always more smug and derogatory in tone 
than the later half of the century, shows an insistence by the Times on the superiority of 
a civilized legal system over the more barbaric method of war in international relations, 
discursively reinforcing the emergence of the U.S. as an impartial and peaceful 
superpower.  In the Cold War Era, the triumph of moderate democracy in Venezuela 
serves as a distinctive mark of civilization.  By the end of the century, the promotion of 
law and democracy combine with a more emphatic promotion of U.S. economic policy to 
outline the hemispheric need for continued intervention. 
 Colonial Era.  Three main situations that involved Venezuela were commented 
on by The New York Times from the period of 1897 through 1908.  The first situation 
addressed a boundary dispute between an independent Venezuela and the neighboring 
British territory of Guiana; the second concerned the possibility of Germany and Great 
Britain going to war with Venezuela to collect its international debt; the third dealt with 
the ownership rights of an American asphalt company and a French cable company 
contested by the Venezuelan government.  All three situations centered on a discussion 
of the role of arbitration as a means superior to war and violence in settling international 
disputes.  “It’s not too late to arbitrate,” argued the Times (“Arbitration,” 1902, p. 8).  
Understanding the trope of surveillance makes visible the discursive work, coming from 
the U.S., of this period in drawing the boundary lines between a civilized, global legal 
system that promises a future of peace and stability and a barbarous, unjust and 
antiquated use of force that only produces violence and chaos.  “The determination of 
this vexed question,” claimed the Times, “is chiefly of importance and interest to the 
  54
United States as an illustration of the superiority of arbitration over war as a method of 
settling international disputes” (“Victory,” 1899, p. 8).  Such a “broad, humane, wise 
principle” is presented as “one that should control civilized nations,” ultimately resulting 
in “the submission of an international contention to the test of reason and justice rather 
than of violence” (ibid).  This “important and valuable page in history” (“Page,” 1897, p. 
6) appears to be a hegemonic shift that discursively separates the ugly, brutal use of Old 
World colonial force from a more sophisticated and methodical form of domination via a 
system of arbitration.   
The metaphor that history is a book frequently appears in this period of the 
Times’ editorials: “records of history” (“Venezuela Arbitration,” 1899, p. 6), “page of 
history” (“Page,” 1897, p. 6), “chapter of history” (“Chapter,” 1901, p. 6).  It emphasizes a 
linear knowledge of history at the expense of a more cyclical one.  Previous chapters 
document the past, but to discover what is to be, one must move ahead to the end.  One 
must move always toward the future.  Corollaries of this understanding of history are 
that the past cannot be changed, that the future is something new and better, that history 
has an authoritative author, and that the written text assumes authority over oral 
tradition. 
This metaphor has implications for the imposition of arbitration as a global 
system.  In order to defend a claim in international court, a responsible and honorable 
nation must submit to “a careful review of the testimony of the maps and 
authorities…evidence…reports and documents…proof” (“Page,” 1897, p. 6).  In order to 
win in court, a nation must in the first place possess these sorts of documentation and 
“proof.”  The rights of ownership are broadly defined as an issue of what arguments and 
evidence make sense in a “civilized” court of law.  This assumes first that the more 
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civilized notion of arbitration can be separated from the brutal use of force, historically 
or even in the present day, and second that ownership is assigned to individuals 
according to a written page or code.  In addition, the assumption that the legal code is 
the just and impartial use of reason highlights the principle of neutrality, the voluntary 
nature of participation, and the fairness of the arbitration process.  It obscure, however, 
the vested interests involved in lawmaking, the role of social status in the courtroom, and 
the use of force required to support a legal system.  These powerful and definitive 
assumptions remain cloaked in and obscured by the incontestable notion that a fair and 
impartial trial is preferable to bloodshed and tyranny.   
 How do fairness and impartiality make sense in this shifting world, when a South 
American republic is pitted against the British Empire in a land or debt dispute in 
international court?  For The New York Times, this David and Goliath match-up could 
only be remedied through the intervention of the United States acting on behalf of 
Venezuela in court.  Here we see the manner in which the U.S.’s burgeoning role as an 
international superpower is understood by the elite newspaper as a progressive, 
mechanical solution to an age-old problem: “From that moment we began to assert our 
own position in the matter with greater and increasing firmness, and forces were set in 
motion that urged the ancient dispute forward swiftly to its peaceful settlement” 
(“Chapter,” 1901, p. 6).  The implications of this new global position for the U.S. 
reinforce the dominance of the emerging superpower over the hemisphere: “The whole 
incident sufficiently indicates the Herculean nature of the labors which the President of 
the United States has shown his willingness to assume in not only guaranteeing but 
enforcing the good behavior of all the republics to the south of us, from the Rio Grande 
to Cape Horn” (“Venezuela,” 1905, p. 6).  Rather than encouraging solidarity between the 
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American republics in resisting the imperial Old World “Goliaths,” the role of the U.S. in 
representing sovereign Venezuela in international arbitration places the U.S. in a 
position of power over European empires as well as Latin American republics. 
The interplay of the concepts of civilized arbitration, progress, and good behavior 
ultimately defines and categorizes the entire hemisphere as economic opportunity for the 
United States.  The Times argued that the U.S.’s role in “developing orderly and 
progressive government” in Venezuela “is the establishment of substantial free trade” 
with the region: 
Such a policy would instantly tend to stimulate the prosperity of the countries, 
make openings for the profitable investment of American and other capital and 
create a growing class deeply interested in orderly administration.  Certainly 
prosperity, agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity are the conditions 
precedent to the progress of the countries in civilization, and these would be 
promoted by the emancipation of trade. (“Muddle,” 1903, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
Courts of law and international arbitration constituted the first steps to mapping the 
ownership rights and legal responsibilities vital to implementing “free” trade in the 
hemisphere.   
Cold War Era.  In the mid-century, another linear metaphor of a “long, hard, 
uphill journey” (“Democracy at Work,” 1958, p. 26) of Latin America toward civilization 
begins to show other familiar “landmarks” of progress (“Venezuelan Campaign,” 1958, p. 
36; “Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20).  The focus of the Times shifted from legal systems to 
Venezuela’s political system.  Venezuelan history before the 1958 democratic election 
was characterized by The New York Times as a veritable dark ages of uncivilized 
dictatorship, during which the “fabulous wealth” of Venezuela’s petroleum resources was 
squandered on “a few favored characters” and “unnecessary luxuries” (“Tragedy,” 1965, 
p. 20).  The Times boasted that “under President Betancourt all that was changed” and 
surveys the blossoming opportunities across the land in the light of Western standards: 
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Venezuela today boasts of being the richest country in the world because of her 
oil, her minerals and her reserves of currency and gold ($870 million for a 
population of 8,500,000).  Her per capita income of about $1,150 is the highest 
in Latin America.  Foreign investments total about $5 billion and are increasing.  
The budget is in surplus and the foreign debt is being reduced.  (“Tragedy,” 1965, 
p. 20, emphasis added) 
 
The most important feat of Venezuela’s democracy for the Times was its 
continuing resistance to Cuban-style revolution.  The Times assessed Venezuelan 
democracy “from a hemispheric point of view,” concluding that “the supreme importance 
of the Betancourt Government is that it is trying to make a social revolution by 
democratic and evolutionary methods” (“More,” 1961, p. 34).  Amid resistance to a U.S.-
style economic and political structure from Venezuela’s left and right, the newspaper 
made its authoritative prescription for moderation: “What Venezuela needs is time and 
political stability” (ibid).  The newspaper’s concept of a free trade-style (r)evolution 
captures an insidious co-optation of the demand for social justice made by the “masses” 
and the radical left.  The free market was pronounced as the only reasonable and 
possible means through which social justice could be achieved.  The revolutionary 
demand for justice, however, is a demand for respite from those same free market 
policies.  As is clear in the case of Venezuela’s recent history, U.S. economic and 
democratic prescriptions merely reproduced the vast inequality between a small urban 
elite and a massive indigent population. 
Current Era.  By the turn of the century, the Times’ surveying tone takes on the 
“modernist sensibility” identified by Spurr (1993) as “impotence, anxiety, and loss” (p. 
23), while still propounding moderate politics as the only solution to rampant instability: 
Violence is looming in Venezuela.  A national strike is crippling its economy.  
Venezuela, the world’s fifth-largest petroleum producer, is starting to run short of 
oil and food.  The demands of President Hugo Chávez and his opponents grow 
more polarized by the day.  The country desperately needs the two sides to 
recognize the danger of playing chicken… 
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The specific solution matters less than getting the government and opposition to 
find a mutually agreeable plan.  Prospects are dismal.  Moderates on both sides 
are being drowned out by hard-liners.  Opposition protests are becoming violent, 
and the government has ignored court orders and allowed its supporters to 
ransack opposition media offices. (“Venezuela on the Brink,” 2002, p. A34, 
emphasis added) 
 
The complete breakdown of law, order, stability, prosperity and peace described 
here is neither contextualized nor historicized by the editors, who nihilistically and 
dramatically mourn a loss of opportunity for the hemisphere.  There is also continuity 
from the colonial-era insistence on a civilized legal system instead of the barbarity of war 
to the current repudiation of violence and antagonism in politics.  By framing the 
overview as a contest between civility and barbarism, the Times reproduced the 
authoritative position of the Western eye over Latin America. 
Other editorials surveyed opportunities of the previous decade, when it seemed 
as if the optimism of the Cold war era had been validated: 
It was 11 years ago that Bill Clinton stood on a stage in Miami flanked by the 
leaders of 33 North and South American countries and proposed a hemispheric 
free trade agreement that would stretch from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.  The 
Free Trade Area of the Americas, to be completed by 2005, would be the largest 
in the world, encompassing 850 million people with $13 trillion in purchasing 
power, its backers said.  The summit meeting rang with optimistic calls about 
forging new ties throughout the region.  The cold war was over, and with the 
single exception of Cuba, all of the region’s countries were democracies and 
believers in open markets, and they were listening to the structural reform 
dictates of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (“Free,” 2005, 
p. A16, emphasis added) 
 
Within a decade, however, and a change in U.S. and Venezuelan governments, the 
prospects for the hemisphere turned dismal for the Times: 
Fast forward to yesterday.  President Bush was in Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
being heckled by protesters, not to mention taunts from the Venezuelan 
president, Hugo Chávez.  Mr. Chávez…has decided to use the summit meeting to 
try to drive a stake through the heart of the free trade agreement.  That’s not a 
tall order; the trade pact is not even on the barest of life-support these days. 
(“Free,” 2005, p. A16, emphasis added) 
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Throughout the Times’ century-long survey of the nation of Venezuela and its “chief” 
importance” to the U.S., one ambition remained clear and steady for the prestigious 
newspaper  – the goal of establishing a U.S.-style free trade system for the entire 
hemisphere.  Civilization and progress remained defined for The New York Times as free 
trade and the legal and behavioral codes that support it.   
By the end of the century, the Times metaphorically conceptualized the 
hemisphere as a neighborhood.  Its understanding of an international neighborhood – 
“stirring trouble in the neighborhood” (“Venezuela’s Political,” 2002, p. A26); “next door 
in Colombia” (“Beleaguered,” 2002, p. A26) – emphasizes the need for a neighborhood 
watch policy while trivializing the power exerted by the U.S. in the hemisphere – “a new 
understanding with the neighborhood superpower” (“Backtracking,” 2003, p. A14).  This 
emergent metaphor seems to eschew earlier instrumentalist and domineering 
understandings of the international relationships between the U.S. and Latin America 
and to present the U.S. as an interested neighbor with benevolent intentions, in effect 
“cloaking” the authoritative tone of the commanding view.   
Appropriation 
The desire for colonial intervention and imposition of the Western ways of life 
were often placed on the colonial object itself in colonial discourse.  The appropriation of 
land, natural resources and people in the colonized territories of Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa occurs concomitantly with an appropriation of the desires, wants and needs of 
the colonized.  Colonial intervention, appropriation, and assumption of authority is 
presented as a response to the call for the wise use of natural resources, for the 
betterment of humanity, and for protection of the colonized from themselves (Spurr, 
1993).  As Spurr has argued, “colonial discourse takes over as it takes cover” (p. 28).  The 
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trope of appropriation was employed fairly consistently in the Times’ discourse on 
Venezuela over the century, ranging from expression of the benevolent and modernizing 
role of capital for natural resources (crops at first, then oil) to the equivocation of the 
desire for democracy with desire for U.S. economic policy to the need to save 
Venezuelans from regressing to dictatorship.  In each era, the Venezuelans are in danger 
of succumbing to their natural backwardness without the intervention and investments 
of the Western world. 
 Colonial Era.  The abundance of natural resources in the tropics of Central and 
South America was of primary concern for many U.S. entrepreneurs at the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  For Westerners, this immense tropical material wealth was 
considered wasted without Western knowledge and skills in extracting and utilizing 
these resources.  The Times made these same assumptions in its assessment of events in 
the region.  According to the editors, as a result of the arbitration decision over the 
boundary dispute with Great Britain, Venezuela lost some territory “that was hers by 
tradition but occupied and improved by Great Britain by the default – through ignorance 
of or indifference to its value – by Venezuela” (“Venezuela Arbitration,” 1899, p. 8).  
Great Britain, on the other hand, “gets a vast area of land about which Venezuela 
probably knows nothing except that Great Britain has occupied and developed it until its 
discovered richness and presumed resources are coveted by Venezuela” (ibid).  The 
colonialist assumption here is that the value of natural resources is determined by its 
“occupation,” “improvement,” and “development” by capital.  Supplementing that 
assumption is one that insinuates the ignorant, lazy and immoral nature of the 
Venezuelan people in matters of progress.   
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The Times explicitly acknowledged the interests of the U.S. – who represented 
Venezuela at the arbitration proceedings in Paris – in “discovering” and developing Latin 
America’s natural resources: “Under the protection of just laws and friendly 
Governments the money of citizens of the United States would accomplish wonders in 
opening up the resources and augmenting the national wealth of these [Latin American] 
republics” (“Trouble,” 1901, p. 6).  In a peaceful and stable world of just laws and 
amicable governments, the investments of the U.S. are imagined to benefit all involved 
by extracting resources and making the Latin American nations wealthy.   
 In reality, this process was met with resistance from Venezuelans that the Times 
interpreted as characteristic ignorance, violence and chaos.  In colonial discourse, in 
order to further the “universal betterment” of humanity, the indigenous must be 
protected from themselves and educated and reformed to desire peace and prosperity 
(Spurr, 1993).  The assumed natural tendencies of non-Westerners toward ignorance and 
chaos permeated the Times’ understanding of international structures and the role of the 
U.S. within.  “We wish,” the Times stated, “that the Governments of all the republics of 
South America could be brought to understand what almost irreparable harm they do to 
their own peoples by their irregular manner of treating just debts.  Next to peace and 
civil order, their chief need is capital to develop their resources” (“Venezuela,” 1902, p. 
8).  Here, the editorial combined the duty to expropriate and develop natural resources 
with the civilizing mission to protect Latin Americans from their natural tendencies.  
This second element locates the desire to be “civilized” within the dominated group: 
The Venezuelans ought to see, however, that they are their own worst enemies.  
Their Castros and their revolutions are a bar to the commercial progress of 
their country, and they prevent its taking a respectable place in the family of 
nations.  The greatest blessing that could happen to them would be the coming 
into power of a Venezuelan Diaz, strong enough to maintain civil order and wise 
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enough to give the Venezuelans a Government they would earnestly desire to 
perpetuate. (“Holland,” 1908, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
The “Diaz” referenced in this passage refers to Mexico’s notorious dictator 
Porfirio Díaz, against whom the famous Mexican Revolution of 1910 was fought and won.  
The economic interests of the U.S. in friendly dictators in Latin America – as opposed to 
unfriendly ones, such as Venezuela’s Cipriano Castro – historically diminished only in 
the face of mounting criticism from Latin Americans of the U.S.’s hypocrisy in 
supporting dictators in American republics.   
 Cold War Era.  By the time Venezuelans revolted against their last dictator, 
Pérez Jiménez, this hegemonic shift was taking place in the U.S.’s political approach to 
Latin America, and the Times displayed a new form of appropriation cloaked in the 
discourse of democracy versus Communist tyranny.  The ignorance and violence 
previously assumed of the Venezuelan people in general was transposed onto 
Communists in particular, and the Venezuelans were positioned as desiring respite from 
this violence and ignorance so that they may instead focus on matters of progress, 
development and economic prosperity.   
The 1958 election itself was positioned as the chance for Venezuelans to express 
their desires and choose their international destiny – to prove “that Latin-American 
countries regaining their freedom know how to use it with restraint and 
honesty…History is offering Venezuela a great opportunity and it is gratifying to see that 
the chances of this opportunity being seized are good” (“Opportunity,” 1958, p. 36).  In 
an orderly democratic election, the Venezuelans achieved their civility and were gathered 
into the fold to fight against barbarism.  The Times triumphantly claimed that “the real 
victory belongs to the Venezuelan people” and assured Americans that “it is clear that the 
voters want an orderly and peaceful succession” (ibid).  In their clear, moderate, and civil 
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rejection of the left and the right, Venezuelans have, according to the Times, expressed 
their preference for U.S. policy: “The vote for democracy is a vote for a peaceful 
transformation of Venezuela’s economic and social system along the lines of the Alliance 
for Progress” (“Victory,” 1963, p. 42). 
 The equivocation between Venezuela’s “vote for democracy” and U.S. President 
Kennedy’s new investment plan for Latin America, known as the Alliance for Progress, is 
an example of the placing of desire for colonial intervention onto the colonized subject 
that characterizes the trope of appropriation in colonial discourse.  Firstly, the Times 
outlined the natural resources that require wise utilization and chart the course for the 
universal betterment of mankind: 
The dictatorship of General Pérez Jiménez, like all dictatorships, left an economic 
and fiscal crisis and a political ferment that need wise and firm direction.  
Venezuela has been blessed with a natural wealth in her oil and minerals that 
offers a guarantee for the future, but the economy of the country must be 
nurtured and diversified.  The immense income from petroleum was never 
spread out among the Venezuelan masses.  The common lot was poverty, 
illiteracy and ill-health.  Agrarian reforms, manufacturing industries, schools, 
roads, housing, irrigation and other public works must be accomplished.  The 
past was dark but the future is bright. (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20, emphasis 
added) 
 
Secondly, they identified the Venezuelan people as the source of desire for the U.S. 
economic plans: “Mr. Kennedy and the Latin-American leaders have made clear that the 
only adequate answer to the Cuban challenge is to bring about the social reforms and 
economic development now demanded by the masses and by the articulate middle 
classes in Latin America” (“Latin-American,” 1961, p. E8).   
In the face of Communist violence, backwardness, and ignorance, the Venezuelan 
people eagerly turned, according to the Times, to the U.S. for assistance in building a 
nation – especially its economy – in the Western image.  According to the Times, a 
journey to South America made by President Kennedy “could not have worked out more 
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satisfactorily.  The absence of any incident, the warmth of the crowds, the right kind of 
publicity for the Alliance for Progress plan, the obviously fruitful conversations with the 
Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia, and the happy impression made by President and 
Mrs. Kennedy added up to a virtually perfect score” (“At Journey’s,” 1961, p. 32).  The 
editors optimistically concluded that the “weekend trip is valuable, but it can only be the 
beginning” (ibid).  This conclusion paves the way toward further U.S. intervention in 
Venezuela’s political and economic progress.  In contrast to the previous dark days of 
violence and chaos, “peace can be won in Venezuela with the help of the United States 
and other members of the Organization of American States.  Peace is essential if the 
victory of the Venezuelan people is to be a lasting one” (“Victory,” 1963, p. 42).  
Intervention was described in terms of the desirability of peace and prosperity in the 
region. 
 As international relations shifted to a postcolonial structure, the metaphor of 
friendship during this era marks this conceptual shift.  Whereas in the colonial era, the 
concept of friendship, confidence or acquaintance was emphasized repeatedly to describe 
the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and European powers – including ones at 
odds with U.S. policy – the concept of friendship was only applied once in reference to 
South American republics.  During the Cold war era studied here, this changed as 
Western civilization triumphs in Venezuela.  Moreover, expressions such as “take to 
heart” (“Yankee,” 1958, p. 28), “best wishes of all who have the future of Venezuela at 
heart” (“Venezuela’s Election,” 1958, p. 38), and “at the heart of the Alliance program” 
(“President,” 1961, p. 42) emphasized this newfound compassion and solidarity on the 
journey toward a civilized hemisphere.  It downplayed, however, the relationships of 
power and domination that continue to play a role.  Interestingly, by 1998, the concept of 
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friendship had all but disappeared, possibly due to its being generally outdated or no 
longer applicable to the nation of Venezuela. 
 Current Era.  As seen with the surveillance trope, prospects for progress have 
turned dismal and nations are losing the battle for peace, prosperity and civility, and 
without civility Venezuelans are in danger of becoming victims of themselves.   
The extraction of natural resources under the leadership of U.S. entrepreneurs 
still pointed the way toward civilization and universal betterment.  For example, the 
Times pointed out that in 1996, “American companies began to pump major oil deposits 
from the waters around Equatorial Guinea and production has been rising steadily.  If 
the new oil revenue is managed well, it can educate, heal and provide jobs for the 
country’s half-million people” (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18).   
However, faced with the global reality that this outcome is perhaps only mythical, 
a caveat appeared in the discourse that the people of the exploited nations were almost 
solely responsible for the success or failure to rise with the tide.  “But oil brings risks as 
well as opportunities,” cautioned the Times.  “Petroleum helps a nation most when its 
government already has democratic accountability, fiscal discipline and a bureaucracy 
that is based on merit and is relatively free of corruption.”  Norway was used in this 
editorial as an example of an oil-producing country that “managed its resources wisely” 
to “broaden the country’s manufacturing base” and sends its “people to college.”  Other 
countries, such as Nigeria, Kuwait, Cameroon, Gabon and Venezuela, suffer from 
“dictators and their cronies.  Oil is particularly corrupting because it is hard to keep track 
of and easy to turn into cash.  It is tempting to spend the sudden windfall on pharaonic 
works or arms.  OPEC countries spend more of their G.N.P. on weapons than do other 
developing countries” (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18).  The violent, immoral and ignorant 
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tendencies of tricontinental peoples seem to always overpower the best intentions of U.S. 
investments.   
 Unfortunately, according to the Times, the ignorance of the Venezuelan people 
has left them once again susceptible to a devastating dictatorial rule:   
President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela – the very portrait of a modern Latin 
American strongman – is not content to exercise near-total political and military 
control of his country.  Now he is tightening his grip on the Venezuelan economy.  
That’s bad news for foreign investors, but even more so for the Venezuelan 
people who will have to pay the price for an economy plagued by increasing 
inefficiency and corruption. (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
After three internationally monitored and approved elections, the Times could only 
assume that the majority of Venezuelans who continues to support Hugo Chávez were 
merely ignorant victims of demagoguery or fearful victims of their own violent and 
corrupt leaders.   
Either way, they were represented as victims of the failure of hemispheric peace, 
stability and free trade policies.  The only hope for the betterment of mankind and the 
rescue of the ignorant poor from themselves was, in the tradition of appropriation, U.S. 
intervention and surveillance: 
The [U.S] administration can best advance American interests, and those of the 
people of Latin America, through more active engagement of the region’s many 
democracies.  It also needs to press ahead with trade agreements and other forms 
of economic assistance and cooperation.  That is the smartest way to counter Mr. 
Chávez’s demagoguery. (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
For the Times, increased intervention in sovereign Latin American states was 
understood simply as diplomatic cooperation with the Latin American desire for (U.S.-
style) democracy: “Washington policy makers should approach the Andean region as a 
whole and work alongside other Latin American nations, like Brazil and Mexico, to 
strengthen democracy in the region” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A24). 
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With the goal in mind of leading the hemisphere in political and economic policy, 
the failures of particular U.S. administrations did not escape the Times’ scrutiny.  At a 
Pan-American summit meeting in 2005, President Bush “failed to get even a minimally 
face-saving outcome at the collapsed trade talks and allowed a loudmouthed opportunist 
like the president of Venezuela to steal the show” (“President,” 2005, p. A26).  (The claim 
that the trade talks collapsed at this summit is itself an ethnocentric assessment that 
subtly neutralizes the possibility that the talks were successful for other Latin American 
leaders and participants involved.)  In its criticism of the U.S. administration, the Times 
looked to former U.S. president Ronald Reagan for inspiration in turning a “messy 
second term around” and delivering “ – in great part through his own powers of 
leadership – a historic series of agreements” that brought the Soviet Union into the 
civilized free market fold (ibid). 
Aestheticization 
The suffering and chaos that seems so representative of life on the three 
continents is frequently interpreted as a lack of law, reason and development, and is 
often presented as a script or a plot played out as a tragedy, suspense or comedy.  The 
effect, Spurr (1993) has argued, is to make the social realities in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America appeared instead as aesthetic qualities, a narrative, or an “object of beauty, 
horror, pleasure, and pity” (p. 59).  In the case of editorializing on Venezuela, this trope 
appears to a great extent during the Cold war era, and to a much lesser extent in colonial 
or current times.  The horror of bloodthirsty tyrants and a mindless, violent primitive 
existence was offset in the colonial era with a ridicule of the banality of this perceived 
Venezuelan reality.  In the mid-century, the horror genre was not especially present so 
much as the dramatic suspense of a nation on the verge of joining the U.S. in its quest for 
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hemispheric civility.  This dramatic climax subsided with the dramatic decade it occurred 
in – a decade quite literally dramatized by the proliferation of television and the evening 
network news – and by the end of the century perhaps a touch of modern nihilism 
sapped the life out of the plots, dramas, conspiracies and suspense of the previous mid-
century era. 
Colonial Era.  Horror and banality, chaos and order, alternated in the editorials 
but were underscored with a sense of mockery.  The horror of irrational bloodthirstiness 
appeared occasionally, reminding the Times’ readers of the obstacles the U.S. faced in 
the journey toward civilized nation-building among the Other: “If they can get along 
without it, it will not be long before the people in Central and South America will insist 
that they shall no longer be kept awake o’nights, or maimed, or slain, to gratify the 
ambition or greed or bloodthirstiness of professional revolutionists” (“Andrade’s,” 1899, 
p. 6).  Also present was the naturalness or banality of this script: “The theatrical 
resignation of Mr. Castro as President of Venezuela is only an added instance of the 
extreme difficulty of dealing with some of the South American Republics” (“Muddle,” 
1903, p. 8).  A hint of ridicule, however, underlines the horror when the Times 
considered intervention on the part of the U.S. to overthrow Venezuela’s dictator: “But, 
as between nations, one great and one little, such expeditions would partake so much 
more of the character of opera bouffe than of tragedy that a sense of the ridiculous would 
prevent a great nation from organizing an expedition to catch Castro” (“Castro and 
France,” 1906, p. 8). 
Finally, a metaphor that the Old imperial powers are bullies helped to justify U.S. 
intervention according to familiar underdog narratives.  Great Britain, according to the 
Times, was “a powerful, well-equipped, and resolute antagonist.  Venezuela would have 
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been constrained beyond any shadow of a doubt if she had faced this conflict alone, to 
yield…as the victorious commander saw fit to demand with the conquered nation” 
(“Victory,” 1899, p. 8).  “Our policy,” stated the Times, “will be to discourage a resort to 
war upon little States for the collection of private debts” (“Venezuela Again,” 1904, p. 6).  
This narrative of standing up for the small, helpless victim emphasized the humanitarian 
intentions of the Times and, by extension, U.S.  It obscured, however, the less-often 
mentioned economic interests:  
Now comes the announcement of blockade as a measure of actual war.  That cuts 
off all commerce and necessarily reduces customs receipts to zero….Our 
merchant ships and the merchant ships of all neutral nations will not be at liberty 
to enter Venezuelan ports.  Our very considerable trade with that republic must 
cease…citizens of the United States will be put to serious inconvenience and loss. 
(“At War,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
That economic interests are at stake may shed light on why this narrative was not always 
employed when evidence pointed to its reality.  The ambivalent role of the underdog 
narrative was often hegemonically employed to justify intervention when economic 
interests were involved. 
Cold War Era.  A sense of drama, bloodshed, mortal enemies and the victory of 
democracy heightened during the Cold war era of the 1960’s, and the opera bouffe had 
transformed into a more sophisticated suspense of a nation on the precarious brink of 
modernization.  This climatic surge came during a decade that U.S. citizens witnessed a 
nuclear missile crisis, the violent death of a United States president, an escalating and 
horrific war against Southeast Asia and successful tricontinental resistance to the 
colonial and imperial structures of power – not to mention the massive civil rights 
uprisings in their own streets.   
Regarding Venezuela, the Times characterized the overthrow of a military 
dictator and the rise to power of an anti-Communist democrat as both a triumph of 
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civilization in Latin America and a precarious situation on the brink of upset and chaos.  
“This is more than just a general election in a Latin-American country,” claimed the 
Times on the eve of the election of the U.S.-favored Rómulo Betancourt as president 
after the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship.  “There are drama and history, anxiety, high hopes 
and intense interest everywhere in the hemisphere” (“Venezuelan Campaign,” 1958, p. 
36).  After the election, the Times described the festivities with which Venezuelans 
entered the civilized world: “Seldom has the hemisphere seen a more impressive 
gathering than the throng of men and women who came from all over the world to honor 
one of Latin America’s most outstanding statesmen and through him to pay tribute to the 
people of Venezuela” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20).   
The newly civilized nation, however, was beset with betrayals and conspiracies 
from both the right and left political extremes: “There seems to be no end to the plots 
against the Betancourt Government in Venezuela….It would be a tragedy for the cause of 
freedom and democracy in the hemisphere if any plot against the present regime in 
Venezuela should succeed” (“Venezuelan Plots,” 1960, p. 42).  The Times set the stage, 
identifying the protagonists and antagonists, providing background information, 
building suspense and resolving conflicts in the name of order: 
Like Shakespeare’s Octavius, President Romulo Betancourt is “bayed about with 
many enemies.”  No Latin-American leader has had such a fierce, unrelenting, 
desperate struggle to stay in office.  Uprisings, attempted assassinations, riots, 
revolutionary strikes, sabotage, guerrillas in the countryside, political 
opposition, economic difficulties – these are the day-to-day picture of 
Venezuela…. Romulo Betancourt has proved himself the most fearless and 
formidable opponent of the Communists in all of Latin America. (“Ferment,” 
1962, p. 40, emphasis added) 
 
Piracy on the high seas, the theft of priceless paintings, bank robberies, 
explosions, fires, riots, guerrilla warfare, deaths – these are the forerunners of 
the visit being paid to the United States by President Romulo Betancourt of 
Venezuela.  There is a paradox as well as a reason behind this dramatic entrance 
onto the American stage. (“Man,” 1963, p. 6, emphasis added) 
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A struggle that will provide another test of the survival powers of democracy in 
Latin America in the face of determined onslaughts by Castro-inspired, 
Communist terrorists is now in its climactic state in Venezuela. (“Terror,” 1963, 
p. 22, emphasis added) 
 
In the midst of danger, the victory for moderate democracy, order and stability 
remained safe, but the almost scripted tension between chaos and order continued to 
play out: 
Venezuela will see her first transfer of power from one constitutionally elected 
President to another tomorrow….This will be a great historic moment for all of 
Latin America….The economic situation is excellent.  The confidence of foreign 
investors has been restored.  The agrarian reform – one of the soundest in Latin 
America – is off to a good start.  The unions have been favored and seem 
satisfied.  The terrorists, backed by the Castro regime with arms, money, 
guerrilla training and propaganda, failed so miserably at the time of the elections 
that they were completely discredited.  The courage of the Venezuelan people in 
turning out en masse to vote constitutionally was one of the most encouraging 
civic manifestations in the recent history of Latin America. (“Venezuelan 
Succession,” 1964, p. 36, emphasis added)   
 
The plot which has just been foiled in Venezuela is proof that this volcanic 
country is still a goal of the world Communist movement… The present stability 
and democracy have been warmly embraced and they are a source of great 
pride, but they are new arrivals in Venezuela.  The army has been unable to 
eradicate the guerrillas in the western mountains or the terrorists in the 
cities….While few in numbers, they are in a fanatical, ruthless, bloody tradition 
that has disfigured the republic’s history since its violent birth….There is no 
reason to fear revolution, but….This is a case for vigilance. (“Moscow,” 1965, p. 
18, emphasis added) 
 
The saga continued until the interest in and number of editorials on Venezuela dropped 
off after 1968. 
Current Era.  After a relatively quiet and orderly three decades from the U.S.’s 
point of view, the vulnerability of civilized democracy in Venezuela resurfaced with the 
election of Hugo Chávez as president in 1998.  The dramatic metaphors of the Cold war 
era, however, were fewer and more restrained: “Six years ago Mr. Chávez led a military 
coup.  It failed, but his messianic assault on the establishment captured the imaginations 
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of poor Venezuelans” (“Venezuela’s Electoral,” 1998, p. A26).  The tension between chaos 
and order also remained: “The crisis in Venezuela is far from over, but the chances of 
resolving it democratically look considerably brighter than they did just a few weeks ago” 
(“Recall,” 2004, p. A28).  Except in its descriptions of Chávez himself, as discussed 
below, the artistic flourishes and scene-setting of the previous era’s editorials were 
utilized less by the turn of the century. 
Classification 
Classifying tricontinental and indigenous peoples according to Western 
standards of political and technological development, colonial discourse judges success 
and failure of other nations and peoples by a single standard of progress that assumes an 
evolutionary nature of civilization.  Westernized nations are more evolved than Others.  
Surveillance draws the boundary between civilization and barbarity, orders and defines 
the values at stake, and provides a panoramic view that places the Western eye in the 
position of authority and ownership.  The trope of classification continues this discursive 
work by employing a linear and hierarchical standard with which to rate the progress of 
nations.  The metaphor that types of government are fashions or styles supports this 
trope.  Statesmen may act in a “particularly unworthy and contemptible fashion” (“We,” 
1904, p. 8) if they do not abide by the standards of diplomatic civility.  Outdated tactics, 
such as a military coup d’état, may be considered “old-fashioned in the hemisphere” 
(“Lull,” 1958, p. 28).  This metaphor of international political styles classifies and 
compares all nations according to the most modernized standard.   
Classification was one of the colonial discourse tropes most frequently reiterated 
by the Times’ editorial board for each era.  In the discourse of the colonial era, the U.S. 
emerged as the global leader in politics, economics and morality, demanding that other 
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nations follow along in pursuit of modernity and civility.  By the mid-century, the Times 
was applying its standards to internal conflicts in Venezuela to distinguish between 
civilized and uncivilized revolutions.  At the end of the century, Venezuela had failed to 
modernize politically and economically according to the Times’ standard, reinforcing the 
need for increased involvement by the U.S.  All signs always point to increased 
intervention. 
 Colonial Era.  As discussed under the category of surveillance, all nations were 
judged by the Times according to their willingness to cooperate with international law 
and to eschew “older and more brutal method of war” (“Venezuela and Alaska,” 1899, p. 
6).  Beyond this overarching standard of acceptable national “behavior,” other 
classifications were made comparing the Old World powers with each other and the U.S., 
the South American republics with the Euroamerican nations, and the South American 
republics with each other.  An emphatically hierarchical order existed for the Times, 
ranging from the U.S. as the most politically, economically and socially evolved, to Great 
Britain, other European nations, cooperative Latin American republics, and finally 
uncooperative Latin Americans.  This discursive work polices and regulates peoples and 
nations, enforcing values according to Western standards of progress.   
In Venezuela’s case, the central theme consisted of proper and practical ways to 
collect and pay international debts: “Worse international manners than Germany has 
exhibited from the beginning of this wretched Venezuela business have rarely come 
under the observation of civilized men….this wanton renewal of hostilities at a time 
when peace negotiations, favored and aided by us, are in progress will wear in the eyes of 
the world the aspect of an affront to our Government” (“German,” 1903, p. 8).  To ignore 
the opportunity for peace and stability that international arbitration provided was 
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“beyond human understanding in these modern days” (“Blockade,” 1902, p. 6).  “It is 
going backward.  It is a reversion to the earlier and the worse way” (“Hague,” 1902, p. 6).  
The admonishment of the old colonial and imperial powers of Europe placed the U.S. as 
the emerging leader of the civilized world.  “The initiative of the United States compared 
with the paralysis of Europe” would fulfill the task of civilization, according to the Times, 
“to awaken the others from their lethargy and lead them forward in the way of justice 
and progress” (“Justice,” 1902, p. 8). 
 The combination of Western concepts of technology, evolution, morality and 
progress underlies the Times’ support of the emerging international legal system.  Of the 
international court established in Paris after the Spanish-American War – the same 
court that ultimately determined the boundary dispute as well as the question of debt 
collection – the Times wrote: “The Hague machinery is, however, erected to enable 
Governments to take up just such causes of difference and to point those who are directly 
involved to the means of an adjustment which cannot humiliate either party and may 
save both.  It is a fairly simple contrivance for the prevention of friction and of the 
unnecessary production of heat” (“Path,” 1903, p. 8).  Metaphors of industrial innovation 
mix with the inevitability of natural evolution to produce a moral triumph: “It is not 
unreasonable, in the light of history, to cherish the hope that The Hague Court will 
finally emerge from all wars as the permanent Judge between the nations” (“Anglo,” 
1904, p. 6).    As the Old and New World nations settled into a new international 
structure of power, the Times viewed this change as a natural evolution of civilization. 
 Lagging behind what the Times considered older and more advanced 
Euroamerican nations were the brutish and unstable Latin American governments: 
It is not what European nations intend to do that gives us anxiety, it is what they 
may be hurried into doing by moving events.  Even a little fire may spread 
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disastrously.  It would be much to our liking if these little fires were never 
kindled in the Western Hemisphere.  We frankly admit that they are kindled by 
the fault of Spanish-American Governments, not very stable at best, and not 
always regardful of obligation.  President Castro is perhaps less sensitive to the 
obligations of his Government than the average South American statesman. 
(“Venezuela,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
Within this classification, the Latin American nations were hierarchically ordered 
according to the civility of their international interactions: 
The American Government now needs to give no thought to any difficulty likely 
to arise in connection with such nations as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.  All 
these States are relatively thriving and correspondingly orderly and easy to 
deal with.  The change in all of them has been marked and highly creditable to 
them, as well as advantageous to us and to the rest of the world.  It is in the 
direction of promoting prosperity in the countries still exposed to unusual 
disturbance that we must look for permanent relief (“Muddle,” 1903, p. 8, 
emphasis added) 
 
On the other hand, when a particular leader or nation remained stubbornly 
uncooperative and uncivil, the cause was assumed to be a lack of reason, a primordial 
stage of civilization: 
President Castro’s organ announces that his is indisposed “to serve as the 
instrument of the United States in the latter’s sinister designs against the weak 
republics of South America.”  It must be inferred that President Castro still 
prefers to pay Venezuelan debts at the cannon’s mouth, rather than as the result 
of procedure taking the place of litigation between nations.  It is as though a man 
should prefer to take the risk of adjudication by a bully’s bludgeon rather than 
by legal process….Nothing but reason is advanced in support of this proposition 
[for arbitration]. (“Lawmakers,” 1906, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
 Cold War Era.  The process of classification, judgment, and admonishment 
continued during this era of Communist and indigenous resistance to United States’ 
control of the Latin American region.  Here, the Times began to apply the Western 
standard internally for Venezuela, identifying the emergence of civilized politics out of a 
chaotic and obscured history of barbarity.  The direction of progress was always linear 
and forward.  In its editorials, the Times took great pains to define and classify good and 
bad types of “revolutions.”  “Each of the four great Latin-American revolutions of the last 
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two and a half years – Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela – has been an 
extraordinary example of civic resistance against dictatorship…relics, anachronisms in a 
region of the world that has been shaking off its long heritage of militarism and 
autocracy” (“Venezuela’s Triumph,” 1958, p. 22).   
In belated and hegemonic attempts to repent for U.S. support for previous 
dictatorial regimes, the Times ambivalently alternated between acknowledging and 
ignoring this history of imperial intervention in Venezuela.  Most often, this situation 
was presented as the success of Latin Americans in defeating their own dark and 
barbaric proclivities and joining civilization on the path to democracy: “At last Venezuela 
is seeing her military men revolt for patriotic reasons and to win freedom and democracy 
for their country, not just to win the spoils of office.  And at last the Venezuelan public is 
being aroused to the point of determined resistance against a brutal and predatory rule” 
(“Writing,” 1958, p. 22).  “Betancourt is the type of statesman upon whom the future of a 
free, democratic, friendly Latin America depends…[T]he people of Venezuela, having 
won their liberty from military tyranny, will not let the clock be turned back” (“Venezuela 
Stands,” 1960, p. E8).  “In this case there are only a few unhappy military officers and 
unpatriotic civilians who might want to turn the clock back” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 
20).   
This metaphor, both mechanical and natural, of turning back a clock reinforced 
the linear essence of political and social progress assumed by the Times and applied to 
Venezuela to measure success and failure of the country in conducting itself properly 
according to “international” standards: “Vigorous economic expansion in eastern 
Venezuela sets an encouraging example for that country’s partners in the lagging 
Alliance for Progress.  The rapid growth of heavy industry and the reclamation of 
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hundreds of thousands of acres of land along the Orinoco River represent the kind of 
progress the Alliance seeks but rarely achieves” (“Venezuela Expands,” 1968, p. 46).  
Conversely, in admonishment: “Whatever happens in Washington, we hope Venezuela is 
not serious about withdrawing from the O.A.S….That would be a disaster for the 
hemisphere and would not contribute to a solution for a problem that the affected 
governments seem gradually to be bringing under control” (“O.A.S.,” 1967, p. 214).  The 
work of classification opened the way toward discursive intervention in the affairs of 
“sovereign” nations. 
Current Era.  By the turn of the century, the omnipresent work of classification 
continued to direct the journey of all nations toward a universal political and economic 
goal shaped in the image of the United States’ Western ideals.  The critique of the 
universality of such a standard began to emerge in the discourse, but it did so 
hegemonically and was not quite resistant, as we see below. 
The election of socialist Hugo Chávez as president of resource-rich Venezuela 
reawakened the Times’ interest in classifying and discursively policing events and 
processes in that country: 
Mr. Chávez could become a populist despot, or could use his mandate to make 
long-needed changes while respecting the rule of law.  Washington and 
Venezuela’s opposition should work with him to encourage a democratic 
approach.  Venezuela’s two main parties, which have traded power for 40 years, 
have squandered the country’s wealth…. 
Washington should make clear it will help Mr. Chávez if he respects 
Venezuelans’ rights and the rule of law.... 
The solution is to deepen democracy, Venezuela’s most important achievement 
of the last 40 years. (“Venezuela’s Electoral,” 1998, p. A26, emphasis added) 
 
When Chávez’s policies began to evidently counter the Times’ hopes for the region, they 
were characterized as “Jacobin decisions” that “seem destined to fail at fighting poverty” 
(“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12).  This refusal to modernize according to U.S. standards, in 
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policymaking or political behavior, was described as self-destructive nonsense that only 
hurt the public that is supposed to be benefiting from free trade with the U.S.  The 
professed concern for the Venezuelan “masses” echoed both previous eras and the trope 
of appropriation.   
During the last decade, the Times has gone to great lengths to portray all 
developments in Venezuela as a regressive, backwards attempt to return to some bygone 
era of power-hungry dictators, bloated bureaucracies, anti-Yankee demagoguery, and 
even rapacious acts of war:  
Mr. Chávez is a former army paratroop colonel who served a jail term after 
attempting a military coup in 1992.  His charisma, identification with the poor 
and revolutionary rhetoric won him the presidency through the ballot box 
instead.  Once in office he established an assembly that sacked hundreds of 
allegedly corrupt judges, stripped Congress of its powers and rewrote the 
Constitution. (“Consolidating,” 2000, p. A24, emphasis added) 
 
According to the Times, Chávez was also prone to “slash the size and powers of 
Congress” (“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12).  The truth of these claims is not contested by this 
study, but rather the manner of presentation that categorizes and reprimands in order to 
intervene on behalf of progress and civilized behavior: “Mr. Chávez needs to rebuild a 
meritocratic and professional bureaucracy in government and state-run companies, 
encourage entrepreneurship across the society and investigate allegations that his 
civilian support groups have been arming themselves” (“Venezuela’s Political,” 2002, p. 
A26).   
The use of the metaphor of violence to represent non-violent political maneuvers 
classifies the actions as primitive.  In the colonial era, the Times chastised the Old 
imperial powers for “presenting with cannon its claim against a debtor nation” (“No,” 
1903, p. 6).  In 2002 – in the days leading up to the coup against Chávez – the Times 
described Their approach to politics: 
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From the outset of his rule, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, targeted the 
traditionally free media, viewing them as a threat to his combative brand of left-
wing authoritarianism.  He routinely launches into diatribes against the press, 
and his followers have physically attacked media outlets. (“Latin America’s 
Muzzled,” 2002, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
In comparison, the Times described Our approach in the same article: 
In the interest of deepening democracy’s roots throughout the Latin Americas, 
Washington should continue encouraging such regional efforts to bolster press 
freedoms.  The Bush administration must also stress the importance of 
protecting free speech in its own dealings with Latin American governments, 
particularly ones like Colombia’s that are eager to gain American support. 
(“Latin America’s Muzzled,” 2002, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
Condescension and admonishment of backwardness were, of course, not limited 
to Venezuela: “It is disturbing to see Mr. Chávez extend an economic lifeline to the 
Cuban dictatorship, particularly when so many Venezuelans remain mired in poverty.  
But concessionary oil sales are a familiar tradition in Latin America” (“Ambitions,” 
2000, p. A38).  “The Andean nations have always been troubled, and lag behind the 
Southern Cone of South America in developing efficient state institutions” (“Containing,” 
2001, p. A14).  The Times often took the liberty of holding up cooperative Latin 
American countries to admonish others: “Brazil’s president is hardly a reckless 
firebrand.  Wall Street applauds his prudent fiscal policies, which helped stave off a 
potential debt and currency crisis that could have affected all emerging markets.  
Moreover, President da Silva has acknowledged that it is important for Colombia to 
defeat its drug-trafficking guerrilla movements” (“Brazil’s,” 2004, p. A14).   
Interestingly, the Times also co-opted the criticism of applying a single standard 
to all peoples of the world, yet still enforced that standard: “In Latin America, policy is 
always up for grabs.  At the moment, leftist candidates are ascending.  This comes after 
the privatization of the 1990’s, the austerity of the 1980’s, the discipline promised by 
military dictatorships in the 1970’s, and the protectionism of the 1960’s.  But every idea 
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disappoints.”  Even so, they argue, a report from the Inter-American Development Bank 
suggests that “life is improving.  Not surprisingly, Chile is at the top of the list.  More 
surprisingly, El Salvador is also highly ranked.  Argentina and Venezuela are near the 
bottom” (“Beyond,” 2006, p. 24).   
The editorial gave a brief nod to the idea that a single standard for all nations is 
problematic, stating that the report “challenges sweeping ideologies, and cautions that 
even programs found to work elsewhere often don’t cross borders well.”  They noted that 
privatizations worked in Chile, but not in Argentina and Bolivia, nations that lack “strong 
regulatory institutions.”  “Success depends,” they argued, “on how policies are adopted 
and carried out.”  This is in essence a negation of their concern with applying a single 
standard:  
The [report’s] researchers conclude that policies created slowly, with popular 
consensus, work best, especially if countries have a professional civil service, a 
capable and well-staffed legislature, an independent judiciary, and 
longstanding political parties with strong ideological platforms… 
these kinds of reforms may be the real revolution, and the one that lasts. 
(“Beyond,” 2006, p. 24, emphasis added) 
 
By contrast, the Times adapted the metaphor that governance was a fashion to 
portray the revolutionary arguments of the emerging Latin American left as “the political 
popularity of these anti-Washington positions” and “part of a growing trend” 
(“Different,” 2005, p. A16).  Equally belittling was the assertion that policy in Latin 
America was analogous to a “constant search for the hot new idea” (“Beyond,” 2006, p. 
A24). 
Caricature Tropes 
The characterizing tropes worked against any shadows of doubt that this 
civilizing mission was moral as well as absolutely inevitable.  Whereas the first four 
tropes outline and delineated, these “caricature tropes” colored in the Times’ colonialist 
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understanding of Latin America, Venezuela in particular here.  Debasement of 
Venezuelan leaders and peoples vilified non-cooperative and non-Western Others.  
Negation supplemented by erasing Venezuelan history and presenting a national space 
void of political, economic or social structures.  Affirmation filled that void with the 
highest order of values (and structures) associated with the U.S.  Naturalization worked 
to make political crises seem natural results of uncivilized social behavior found in 
Venezuela.  Each four supported, in different ways, the argument that the U.S. should be 
more involved in political and economic policy in Latin America. 
Debasement 
The trope of debasement in colonial discourse emphasizes the negative of 
Western values.  An individual Other often stands in metonymically for the whole group, 
and the baseness reiterates the distinction between civilized and uncivilized cultures and 
justifies the need for intervention.  In this case, I found that the Times applied rigorous 
character debasement of the Other in both the colonial and current eras but was much 
more carefully worded and diplomatic during the Cold war era.   
The caricature of a childish, impudent, uncivilized or criminal Other pervaded 
the colonial era, as would be expected.  This groundwork, however, and many of the 
colorful metaphors used, remained structurally intact to the present day, regardless of 
ambivalent attempts in the Times’ discourse to separate innocent publics from corrupt 
leaders.  Underneath a newfound politically correct language, the debasement lingered.  
The stark decrease in debasing assumptions during the mid-century occurred when a 
“friendly” government took power in Venezuela, unlike the other two periods.  Even 
though debasement of non-Westerners continued to occur during this decade, the 
decrease may point to a more pragmatic employment of Othering by the Times that is a 
  82
different, albeit related, mode of discourse than essentialist Othering.  The interplay 
between these two forms of Othering – practical and essentialist – and economic 
interests seems subtle but central to U.S. global hegemony throughout the three eras. 
Colonial Era.  From 1899 to 1908 the military dictator Cipriano Castro held the 
presidency in Venezuela.  In contrast to other more “friendly” dictators, such as Mexico’s 
Díaz, Castro was opposed to the power over the region held by U.S. and European 
powers (Ewell, 1996).  Of particular concern to the Times during his rule was Castro’s 
evasive and critical approach to paying Venezuela’s international debts.  The Times 
periodically acknowledged Venezuela’s criticism of the fairness of the debts incurred, but 
ultimately insisted that the Venezuelan character was to blame for its predicament: 
“Quite too often the debt itself is not justly due, being, as in the Venezuelan case, largely 
made up of extortions easily practiced upon the debtor by reason either of his 
improvidence or his bad credit” (“End,” 1903, p. 6).  “But it does not behoove a sovereign 
State to plead the baby act,” argued in an editorial that a) characterized Venezuela as a 
child among men in international matters, b) interchangeably admonished individuals 
and Venezuelan society as a whole, and c) distinguished between civilized cultures and 
unrefined, morally questionable ones.  “That is the risk which Venezuela, or the 
immediate Venezuelan debtors, had to confront when it or they promised larger returns 
from a loan than an intelligent and honest business concern would have had to pay.  
They had to pay for the moral risk involved in their own bad character” (“Coercing,” 
1902, p. 8).  According to the Times, the Venezuelan borrower lacked the moral fiber 
necessary to delay personal gratification in the interest of pursuing the avowed public 
project, and this primitive behavior explained the extortionate debts.   
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The debasement of the character of Venezuelans in this regard separates them 
from the more sophisticated and civilized international position of the U.S.: 
If the Venezuelans, or their Government, fondly imagined that the United States 
would stand by them in an effort to cheat their creditors, they were woefully 
deceived…. 
We do not…”stand for” fraudulent debtors any more than we stand for pirates 
and highwaymen…. 
More than one of the “little convulsive republics” is in the condition of a 
fraudulent debtor, and Haiti, at least, has come too near to the international 
status of a pirate or highwayman, or other enemy of the human race. 
(“Coercing,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added) 
  
The pirate metaphor distinguishes people of law and order from a race of thieves and 
cheaters: 
Mr. Manuel Silvera, who left Havana hurriedly for Venezuela last October with 
the treasure ship of J. M. Ceballos & Co., is reported to be flourishing as the 
wickedly traditionally flourish.  President Castro and a number of Government 
officials and business men have made him their associate…. 
He lives and moves in the fashionable parts of Caracas, whose society is, of 
course, reluctant to think that a thief may not be admired. (“Editorial,” 1907, p. 
6, emphasis added) 
 
The Times particularly concerned itself with the Venezuelan president and with 
“dealing with such an outlaw in the interests of civilization” (“Castro and the Powers,” 
1905, p. 8).  Metaphorically referring to Castro as a bird of prey, the editors wrote: 
“Perched in his inaccessible eyrie at Caracas, he laughs at the shaking of the big stick 
from Washington and the threats of France to bombard the ports, the property of his 
preferred creditors.  The role of Ishmael is already familiar and congenial to him.  Some 
means of course must be found to reduce him to some semblance of decency” (ibid).  The 
case for colonial or imperial intervention is often built on such character debasement 
(Said, 1978; Spurr, 1993), as we have seen most recently with Saddam Hussein and the 
intervention in Iraq.  With an uncooperative head of state, the representations seemed to 
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be those of utter irrationality and whimsy that make it impossible to get along 
diplomatically: 
President Castro is not a serious man.  It is impossible to take seriously the head 
of a State who officially and personally, in public and in private, conducts himself 
in so queer a way.  The restraints which the responsibilities of high office usually 
impose even upon exuberant natures Castro gaily flouts, and of public opinion, 
whether at home or abroad, he appears to take no account whatever.  His 
Government is as queer as himself.  It is exceedingly difficult for other nations to 
“get on” with a country in which the Chief Executive is in the habit of sending a 
note around to the highest court to decide according to his will and command 
causes of international interest and importance…. 
Manifestly any Power whose citizens maintain commercial relations with a 
country in which law and justice are administered in such a manner must expect 
to find itself called upon sooner or later to redress international wrongs. 
(“Venezuela and Santo Domingo,” 1905, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
This “chartered libertine” (“Castro and France,” 1906, p. 8), according to the 
Times, “is everything he ought not to be, and deserves all the punishment coming to 
Venezuela for his misdeeds” (“Venezuelan Porcupine,” 1906, p. 8).  His base qualities 
were noted as consistently as they were distinguishable from civilized statesmanship and 
ultimately served as the justification for the U.S. government to intervene and protect 
itself: “He is exceedingly apt to be vain, foolhardy, and fond of display.  The exhibition of 
these qualities by Castro tends to bring about the situation which would cause us 
uneasiness” (“British,” 1902, p. 8). 
As personal as the Times’ assessment of Cipriano Castro was, the Venezuelans as 
a whole did not escape character debasement: “Castro is at present, and for some years 
has been the fount and origin of Venezuela’s troubles.  About the only good thing said 
about that gentleman is that he is, possibly, the only Venezuelan living who can keep the 
Venezuelans in order” (“Holland,” 1908, p. 8).  Whether through acts of war or 
arbitration, the Venezuelans were represented as learning lessons in civilized behavior: 
No one will deny that the lesson in “ordinary courtesy” which Commodore 
Montgomerie of the British squadron wished to enforce upon the misbehaving 
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rabble of Puerto Caberlo [sic] was needed.  They had gone aboard a British 
merchant ship, hauled down the British flag, and otherwise misbehaved…. 
They [the British] are dealing with a passionate and unreasoning people.  Acts of 
outrage and misbehavior they must expect. (“Pacific,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis 
added) 
 
To Venezuela herself, the lesson has undoubtedly been, if not the most salutary, 
at least the most severe…. 
Venezuela learns not only that it does not pay to repudiate debts, but that that 
there is great danger in the improvident incurring of them.  The Venezuelans 
have been foolish and heedless, and their Government has been corrupt…. 
They have got a lesson in business and financial wisdom which, let us hope, will 
be remembered (“End,” 1903, p. 6, emphasis added) 
 
In discussing the “lessons” learned by the other nations involved in the altercations, 
Great Britain and Germany, the Times carefully distinguished between the actions of the 
monarchical governments and the opinions and desires of the publics, faulting only the 
former.   
Finally, the Times engaged in the sport of ridicule, which further disempowers 
the tricontinental challenge to the international structure of power: 
He [Castro] was dancing under the trees in a very lively and frolicsome 
fashion….he struck a Napoleonic attitude, waved his arms excitedly in the air 
and declaimed: “Gen. Castro never apologizes”… 
The crowd took up the cry, whirling around their partners in an excited 
fandango, and beating the empty bottles from which they had been drinking on 
the little iron tables which stood around.  This is the way important diplomatic 
questions are decided in Venezuela (“Near,” 1903, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
Another source of amusement for the Times derived from a habit of the Latin 
American elite in visiting or living in Paris: “It appears that he should equally exempt 
France…his general attitude denotes that the measure of his iniquities and of his bank 
account is nearly full, and that he is preparing to retire.  History teaches us that bad 
South Americans, when they abdicate, go to Paris….He seems to be preparing for himself 
a dismal old age” (“France,” 1905, p. 8).  Accusing the president of embezzling 
international loans and foreign investments, the Times scoffed that if Cipriano Castro 
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were to be overthrown by rebellious uprisings in Venezuela, “then he will need his 
German and British money to cheer and console his declining days in Paris” (“Case,” 
1902, p. 8).  This form of debasement – ridiculing attempts to imitate the West – can be 
a powerful way to continually separate ourselves from the Other as they modernize to 
Western standards (Spurr, 1993). 
Cold War Era.  Debasement was most elaborate and pronounced during the 
Colonial era.  The Cold war era saw more “friendly” relations between the U.S. and 
Venezuela, as the latter took a hard line against internal Communist movements as well 
as the Cuban revolution.  Nevertheless, the tendency of the elite newspaper to regard 
Others with exasperated disdain occasionally shined through the predominately 
diplomatic speech.  Addressing the tumultuous transition from dictatorship to 
democracy in the midst of Communist resistance in the region, the Times belittled the 
frequent uprisings: “It is getting so that an attempted coup d’état is hardly to be rated as 
news.  Before dawn yesterday – the customary time – another group of unknown and 
dim-witted officers tried still another uprising, with the usual results” (“More,” 1961, p. 
34).  And again that same year: “Attempted revolts in Venezuela are coming with almost 
monotonous frequency….there are good reasons why such idiotic rebellions as 
yesterday’s cannot be dismissed too lightly” (“Flare-Up,” 1961, p. 32).  Even in its hope 
for U.S.-style stability in the region, the Times seemed skeptical and condescending 
about the Venezuelans’ capabilities for civic life: “The people of Venezuela want an 
elected government – and they have one today.  All they need is peace to work out their 
problems” (“Venezuela’s Fruitful,” 1959, p. 30).  How this “peace” was defined or 
established was not an issue of debate for the editors. 
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Current Era.  As seen in the Cold war era, the debasement of the Other becomes 
less flagrant throughout the century, to a large extent in response to resistance to 
imperial racist discourse in the U.S. and abroad.  Debasing discourse on Venezuela in the 
Times from 1998 to 2007 predominately focused on the figure of President Chávez, 
vilifying him as the enemy of the hard-earned democracy and civility in Latin America: 
“Mr. Chávez, a former paratroop commander who staged an unsuccessful military coup 
in 1992, has so far shown little respect for the compromises necessary in a democracy, 
which Venezuela has had for 40 years” (“Emergence,” 1999, p. A12).  Regardless of the 
economic and political devastation that resulted from the last four decades of democratic 
elections in Venezuela, the Times consistently portrayed Chávez as an anachronistic relic 
of the bygone era of immoral, power-hungry dictators in Latin America and an enemy of 
civilized constitutionalism: 
The kind of lucky breaks President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela has been getting 
lately could tempt even a modest man – and Mr. Chávez is no modest man – to 
dream grandiose dreams.  High oil prices, a terminally inept opposition and the 
Bush administration’s scandalous neglect of its Western Hemisphere neighbors 
have left the field wide open for Mr. Chávez to bully people at home, buy friends 
abroad and annoy Washington at every turn…. 
He has marginalized Congress, undermined judicial independence and 
prosecuted political opponents.  By tightening control of the national oil 
company, he has been able to use high world oil prices to increase funds for 
popular social programs for the poor, making him electorally unassailable.  That 
dangerous concentration of power will most likely worsen (“Hugo Chávez and 
His Helpers,” 2005, p. A14, emphasis added) 
 
Occasionally, the Times’ palpable frustration with Chávez’s lengthy democratic 
tenure manifested itself as a disappointment in and condescension of Venezuelans, Latin 
Americans or emergent democracies in general: “In other new democracies in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, voters at this point have tended to grow nostalgic for 
dictatorship or eager to find an outsider who promises revolution” (“Mexico’s,” 2006, p. 
A18).  After six years of sympathizing with and supporting Chávez’s minority opposition 
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in Venezuela, the Times ultimately judged them by their failure to reinstate a civilized 
and refined rule in Venezuela: 
The opposition, meanwhile, needs to stop shouting foul.  It ran a generally inept 
referendum campaign, failing to unite around a single, credible challenger to Mr. 
Chávez and failing to distance itself adequately from the oligarchic politics of the 
discredited past.  A healthy Venezuelan democracy needs not just a less divisive 
Mr. Chávez.  It also needs a more realistic and effective opposition. (“Hugo 
Chávez Wins,” 2004, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
For the sixty percent majority that continued to support Chávez, “the opposition can 
blame only itself….That petulant idiocy [boycotting the recent Congressional elections] 
frustrated regional diplomats…and mystified and disenfranchised Venezuelan voters” 
(“Hugo Chávez and His Helpers,” 2005, p. A14).  The voters in Venezuelan were 
predominately characterized by the Times as victims of demagoguery, susceptible to 
populist handouts and ignorant of their real interests: 
The reason Mr. Chávez survived the challenge, despite his authoritarian 
impulses, is not hard to figure out…he has been able to use higher-than-expected 
oil revenues to advance social welfare.  Some of his programs have been poorly 
designed and shamelessly used to build and mobilize political support.  All the 
same, they are understandably appreciated by the millions of Venezuelans who 
have felt like the neglected stepchildren of the country’s oil boom. (“Hugo Chávez 
Wins,” 2004, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
The Times also continued to ridicule the Other’s attempts to imitate the Western 
ways of global statesmanship and civic life.  Of a pan-American conference that proved 
disappointing for the Times in its failure to promote U.S.-style free trade policies, the 
newspaper flippantly characterized even the general theme of the international summit 
as naïve and inefficient: “’Creating Jobs to Fight Poverty and Strengthen Democratic 
Governance’ is the mouthful that’s the theme of this meeting” (“Free,” 2005, p. A16).  
Moreover, the trope of Paris-frequenting dictators continued to distinguish sophisticated 
global leaders from the imitations: “Rarely have developing countries used oil money to 
improve the lives of the majority of citizens or bring steady economic growth.  More 
  89
often, oil revenues have caused crippling economic distortions and been spent on showy 
projects, weapons and Paris shopping trips for government officials” (“Petro-Curse,” 
2000, p. A18).  President Chávez was characterized in the same ridiculous manner as 
Cipriano Castro of a century before, his criticisms of U.S. foreign policy characterized as 
a “Yanqui-baiting game” (“Venezuela Inc.’s,” 2007, p. A22): 
A month earlier, at the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, Mr. Chávez 
cavorted before crowds of anti-Washington protestors and networked with his 
fellow Latin American presidents.  He is hoping that either Argentina or Brazil 
will sell him a nuclear reactor, a step that would be a very bad idea considering 
Venezuela’s burgeoning friendship with Iran and the excessive indulgence 
Caracas has shown toward Iranian nuclear ambitions. (“Hugo Chávez and His 
Helpers,” 2005, p. A14, emphasis added) 
 
This last example points to the ultimate work of the discursive trope of 
debasement: intervention.  The Times’ consistent assessment of U.S. policy toward Latin 
America was that the Bush administration was not involved enough.  This argument for 
intervention appeared cloaked in the humanitarian garb of saving the barbarians from 
themselves.  Washington, they argued, “needs to compete more deftly and actively with 
Mr. Chávez for regional influence, and look for ways to work with the hemisphere’s other 
democracies to revive the multiparty competitive democracy that has now just about 
ceased to exist in Venezuela” (ibid). 
Negation 
Colonial discourse often represents the Other as an empty void that awaits to be 
filled with Western values of reason, order, development and progress.  Spurr has argued 
that a modernist perspective differs from the opportunism found in earlier discourse in 
that the tone changes to one of modern angst over a tricontinental wasteland.  In the 
Times’ characterization of Venezuela, a lack of law, order and development in the 
colonial era shifted into an erasure of politico-economic structure in the mid-century 
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preparation for Venezuela’s admission into the civilized world.  It then shifted again to 
characterize a bloated, corrupt and soiled wasteland during the Chávez presidency. 
Colonial Era.  In this case of the Times discourse on Venezuela, a modern angst 
seemed to already be present by the late nineteenth century.  Because Castro was not a 
trustworthy and respectable leader, such as Mexico’s Díaz, argued the Times, the 
Venezuelans would suffer from the lack of development: “A new enterprise…would be 
foredoomed from the start.  Nobody would put any money in it, except as he might 
venture money on the turning of a card or of a wheel.  The nation which allows itself to 
be represented by a Castro pays for that privilege, as Venezuelans will pay until she 
concludes that the privilege is not worth what it costs” (“Castro and France,” 1906, p. 8). 
The gambling metaphor underscores a sense of loss and emptiness that characterized 
Castro’s Venezuela according to the Times.  This emptiness was a result of a perceived 
lack of law and order: “He would be a wise man indeed who could tell what the laws of 
Venezuela, as interpreted by its President, might at any given moment turn out to be, or 
what, for that matter, the lawmaking power might prove to be” (“President,” 1905, p. 6). 
The answer, for the Times, to Venezuela’s non-existent understanding of 
international diplomacy and financial obligations consisted of filling that empty space 
with U.S. investments: “We have ways of maintaining the inviolability of the Monroe 
doctrine that are more direct, straightforward, and less embarrassing than an 
entanglement with irresponsible South American Governments….The sending there of 
American money and American men to develop its resources and increase its wealth 
would naturally augment its ability to pay its debts” (“Coming,” 1902, p. 8). 
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Cold War Era.  During the first decade of democratic elections in Venezuela, 
the Times represented the entire history of the country as a dark ages that left Venezuela 
with no political, social or economic structure: 
In all her history of the past century and a half Venezuela has been under 
civilian rule for only three years…. 
For ten years the nation suffered under one of the most corrupt and brutal 
dictatorships in Latin-American history.  The corruption has led to an economic 
and financial crisis especially shameful to a country making the huge income 
that accrued to Venezuela from the oil industry.  The brutality has led among 
other things to such hatred and bitterness…that the populace virtually goes 
mad. (“Venezuela is Saved,” 1958, p. 34, emphasis added) 
 
The negative space caused by Venezuela’s previous rulers was extensive: “The 
Pérez Jiménez regime ruined one of the richest nations of the hemisphere in the sense 
that it left an enormous debt and did so little productive capital expenditure, so little 
social reform and so little in fields like education” (“Venezuela’s Fruitful,” 1959, p. 30).  
It was also consistently reinforced: 
Venezuela was almost uninterruptedly under military rulers for nearly a 
century and a half…. 
The economy was left in bankruptcy by the dictator, Pérez Jiménez.  The 
American petroleum industry, which is so vital to Venezuela’s economy, is not 
helping the Betancourt regime.  There is inflation, unemployment, a huge 
budgetary deficit, an unfavorable balance of trade…. 
The United States, let it be noted, is doing its best to help the Betancourt regime, 
which lurches perilously ahead despite handicaps and uprisings such as 
yesterday’s. (“Flare-Up, 1961, p. 32, emphasis added) 
 
The occasional reference to the role of U.S. companies in the region took on this tone of 
admonishing them for their indifference or lack of involvement, placing the blame for 
economic “failure” squarely on the ignorance or corruption of the Venezuelans.   
As a result, the Times urged increased U.S. intervention in order to bring reason 
and order to the region: “He [Betancourt] is under attack from the Left and the Right.  
The economy of his country is in bad shape because of the extravagances and heavy 
indebtedness of the dictator General Pérez Jiménez….The United States must, and surely 
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will, help all it can” (“More,” 1961, p. 34).  President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress 
regional investment plan provided the structure needed to fill the void: 
On the positive side, Mr. Kennedy has an intangible but important asset.  What 
is now called his “image” is a good one in Latin America.  He is identified with a 
genuine desire to help the common man, to bring about the social justice for 
which Latin Americans are clamoring, and to identify the United States 
generally with the struggle to meet the popular and democratic challenges of our 
times… 
The Alliance for Progress plan that President Kennedy is pushing is concentrated 
on social reforms and especially housing, education and land reform. 
(“President,” 1961, p. 42, emphasis added) 
 
Leaders of South America, by contrast, “are beset by critical divisions in their parties or 
coalitions which could damage the cause of democracy far beyond the borders of Chile, 
Venezuela and Peru” (“Latin,” 1967, p. 46). 
Current Era.  The Times’ once-unwavering support of Venezuela’s “40 years of 
democracy” turned somewhat nihilistic as the U.S.’s desires for the region remained 
unfulfilled and poor and rural Latin Americans heightened their resistance to the 
superpower.  The editors assessed the wasteland, criticizing “corruption and economic 
mismanagement that have brought a once-prosperous country to misery” 
(“Consolidating,” 2000, p. A24).  The weakness of the Venezuelans explained their 
laziness and capitulation to the corrosive effects of oil: 
In the last decade, when other Latin American countries were carrying out 
needed economic reforms, Venezuela’s oil cushion sapped the political will for 
needed austerity programs.  Many Venezuelans believe that oil has also undercut 
the importance of personal initiative by offering wealth without work…. 
But even leaders aware of the pitfalls of oil will not be able to avoid them if 
corruption and mismanagement are endemic. (“Petro-Curse,” 2000, p. A18, 
emphasis added) 
 
  Often negation applied to the region as a whole: “The lack of rule of law has led 
to autocratic leadership in Venezuela, Bolivia and…Peru as well” (“Containing,” 2001, p. 
A14).  “Elsewhere, the region is disillusioned with the last decade’s free-market reforms.  
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Too often twisted into a corrosive form of crony capitalism, the ‘Washington consensus’ 
did little to improve living standards or alleviate poverty.  The economic disillusionment 
has devalued the appeal of democracy as a form of governance and empowered once-
marginalized political forces” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A 24).  The Times consistently 
described a lack of political structure and the defeat of democracy in the region: “Such 
demands seek to short-circuit the democratic process.  Usually occurring in the most 
unfortunate countries, they degrade institutions, polarize politics and impede the 
continuity necessary for growth….While many protesters want to destroy everything and 
start from zero, Latin America needs more continuity, not less” (“Latin America’s Half-
Term,” 2004, p. A26). 
Of the near-total economic and social failure described by the Times, the editors 
conceded some responsibility of U.S. policy: “One explanation is that nearly two decades 
of Washington-recommended economic and trade policies have not done much for 
millions of urban and rural poor” (“Different,” 2005, p. A16).  The Times, however, 
argued that the absence of U.S. intervention was to blame for the apparent regression of 
the “left-behind and angry poor,” who were voting for demagogic “denunciations of 
Yanqui imperialism” (ibid).  In the final analysis, the void that is – and always has been – 
Venezuelan politics can only be filled by the U.S.: “If your taste runs to three-hour 
speeches, chiseling away at democracy and a world-class personality cult, Mr. Chávez is 
your man.  But if the goal is to lift millions of people out of grinding poverty, only a 
major effort by the United States – the hemisphere’s biggest economy and strongest 
democracy – can make a serious difference” (“Thanks,” 2007, p. A20). 
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Affirmation 
The employment of the trope of negation in colonial discourse is complemented 
by an emphasis on the positive side of Western values.  Whereas the Other represents 
nothingness, Western society provides the values of civilization, humanity, science and 
progress that alone can modernize the rest of the world.  This trope characterizes the 
U.S.’s benevolent interventions and moral duty to raise the rest of the world from its 
debased and empty existence.  In each of the time periods I analyzed, the Times’ 
editorials showed no question, no shadow of a doubt, that the United States constituted 
the single, universal guiding light toward civilized society for Venezuela and the world.  
Consistently reproducing and reinforcing the self-affirmation of Western values of 
progress, the Times lays claim to the White Man’s Burden in the colonial era, transposed 
that civilizing mission onto Latin American leaders in the Cold war era, and continued in 
the current era to position the values of democracy, liberty and stability as the sensible 
and professional Western remedies to Venezuela’s negative. 
Colonial Era.  Taking the moral high ground in a stand against the aggressive 
nature of European imperial powers, the Times positioned the U.S. as a guiding light for 
the evolution of civilization from war and barbarism to rules, regulation and arbitration: 
Enough has been given to show that there has been for many years much blind 
following, by diplomatic officers and careless historians, of misleading 
assertions concerning the Venezuela-Guiana boundary; and the turn that was 
given to the controversy by the United States becomes most satisfactory to 
contemplate in the light of this report, which will doubtless be a new light to the 
arbitral tribunal that is to settle the boundary for Great Britain and Venezuela. 
(“Venezuela Report,” 1897, p. 6, emphasis added) 
 
Assessing the U.S.’s role in securing negotiations, the Times argued that “already it is an 
established and immutable truth of history that” then-President Grover Cleveland 
“exhibited the qualities that constitute the highest statesmanship and performed a duty 
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that for his country and for human civilization was of incalculable value.”  The actions of 
the U.S. president, argued the Times, “led promptly to peaceful and honorable 
settlement…Venezuela was protected…the Monroe Doctrine was affirmed…Great Britain 
remains our best friend….Mr. Cleveland out of that series of grave events brought peace 
with honor” (“New,” 1901, p. 6).  The intervention of the U.S., however necessary to the 
progress of civilization, was commonly portrayed as a reluctant duty – the White Man’s 
Burden: “Germany and Great Britain seem disposed to force upon Mr. Roosevelt the task 
of arbitrating their differences with Venezuela.  If their urgency overcomes his reluctance 
he will certainly have the right to impose certain responsible conditions” (“Mr. 
Roosevelt,” 1902, p. 8).  The actions taken by the United States were represented as 
nothing short of messianic: 
It was, indeed, a Christmas gift to the whole wide world, a gift to mankind at 
large, since it manifestly saved The Hague Court from the impending peril of 
being passed by and forgotten…. 
By the action of our Government it is now in a way to be restored to general 
esteem and its rightful place….If we have saved the tribunal from falling into 
disuse all civilized nations will share the benefit of our act. (“Justice,” 1902, p. 8, 
emphasis added) 
 
The implications of such heroic feats of the U.S. for the benefit of all mankind 
justified intervention: “The Republic of Venezuela is under obligations to us for bringing 
about the arbitration which peacefully settled her boundary dispute with Great Britain.  
We can justly make some draft upon her sense of gratitude now by indicating to her 
President that we should be greatly pleased to see him come to some prompt 
understanding with the republic’s creditors” (“British,” 1902, p. 8).  The interventions 
and assumptions of authority work to restructure Venezuela’s society and economy to 
the U.S.’s benefit, albeit under the guises of humanitarianism and neutrality that 
demand “merit systems,” “stability,” “peace,” “intelligence and experience,” and 
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“practical and sensible plans.”  Of the demand that then-President Castro submit to legal 
arbitration concerning the payment of U.S. citizens’ loans and investments in Venezuela, 
the Times assumed for the U.S. government and public a neutral, practical and impartial 
stance: “This is really the strong point in the case of the United States.  Our Government 
has unquestionably shown great care and patience in every phase of negotiations.  There 
has not been the slightest manifestation of a domineering spirit or failure to treat the 
Venezuelan Government with respect and with friendliness” (“Venezuela Botheration,” 
1908, p. 6).  This statement may easily be considered blatantly false simply within the 
Times’ own editorials.  The discursive work it does, however, is to position the U.S. as the 
world’s champion of reason and fairness: “But in any case our people must bear in mind, 
and the world must be called upon to witness, that the utmost that our Government 
requires of Venezuela is that strong prima facie claims shall be submitted to fair and 
impartial arbitration” (ibid).   
The historical results of the arbitration speak against this professed impartiality.  
The boundary issue, still in dispute today, had been decided by the Hague against 
Venezuela via collusion between Great Britain and a Russian judge, trading judgments as 
political favors (Ewell, 1996).  Venezuela’s international debt was eventually paid down 
in the 1930s via oil concessions to U.S. companies (Coronil, 1996).  In contrast to its own 
continuous affirmative rhetoric, such as was propounded by the Times, the U.S. can 
never really be the impartial or neutral mediator it so often claims for itself.  These self-
affirming claims to reasonable, impartial international politics are the discursive, 
ideological work that ultimately results in real consequences – urgent, material, and 
often brutally violent. 
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Cold War Era.  During this time period, the U.S. was experiencing sustained 
criticism of its support of dictators by Latin American leaders, such as the Venezuelan 
democrat Betancourt.  In this era, the trope of affirmation seemed to shed its direct 
assumption of an imperial civilizing mission and was instead employed in a combination 
of championing the role and values of the U.S. and transposing those values onto 
particular cooperative Latin Americans:  
It was signed by a long list of distinguished statesmen, scholars, political leaders 
and editors in many of the Latin-American countries and was circulated 
throughout the hemisphere in the free press.  It is a firm and dignified statement 
of the democratic principles that should guide Latin-American nations and an 
expression of faith in the fitness and readiness of the Latin countries for 
democracy. (“Democracy at Work,” 1958, p. 26, emphasis added) 
 
The hegemonic shift in discourse, however, was a thin veil for the Times’ 
propensity for self-affirmation.  Quoting U.S. President Eisenhower (a staunch supporter 
of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorial regime) and, in a way taking credit for the revolt of 
Venezuelans against their last dictator, the Times bombastically declared: 
“The United States believes firmly in the democratic elective process and the 
choice by the people through free and fair elections of democratic governments 
responsive to them.  Authoritarianism and autocracy of whatever form are 
incompatible with the ideals of our great leaders of the past.  Free institutions, 
respect for individual rights and the inherent dignity of man are the heritage of 
our Western civilization.”  The dictators of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and 
Paraguay might wisely take note. (“Democracy in Venezuela,” 1958, p. 28, 
emphasis added) 
 
Of Senator Nelson Rockefeller’s business trip to South America, the Times 
relayed his “intelligent helpfulness” and portrayed Latin Americans as eagerly accepting 
of the U.S.’s modernization plans: 
He had demonstrated how strains of cattle can be improved, how more and 
better rice and wheat can be grown, and generally how South Americans can be 
encouraged to help themselves.  That anyone so knowledgeable about Latin 
America and so friendly to its people should have been elected to one of the 
highest political positions in the United States naturally interested and pleased 
everyone south of the Rio Grande. (“Yankee,” 1958, p. 28, emphasis added) 
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This assessment of the oilman’s business in South America foreshadowed the Times’ 
approval and promotion of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress plan:  
If it succeeds, it will transform the social, economic and political structures of all 
the Latin-American nations.  In its aims…this is an attempt to make a veritable 
social revolution in Latin America.  In its simplest terms, the Alliance for 
Progress is an effort to bring about social and economic reforms by democratic, 
evolutionary methods.  The emphasis is on land reform, housing, education and 
welfare, all of which would accompany economic development. (“Latin-
American,” 1961, p. E8, emphasis added) 
 
This optimistic hope for progress in Venezuela fills that nation’s void, its non-history, 
with aspirations for a complete structural overhaul in the image of Western civilization.  
Nothing short of a messianic guiding light. 
Current Era.  Faced with an increasingly resistant and indignant Latin America 
at the turn of the century, the Times remained firmly convinced that a U.S.-led, free-
trading, and civic global society was the only answer to the void that continued to exist in 
the Latin American character:  
Mr. Chávez’s vague “Bolivarian” ideology – inspired by the achievement of 
Venezuela’s national liberator, Simon Bolivar, in briefly uniting present-day 
Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador – understandably worries neighboring 
governments.  But Washington can reinforce the political stability of 
Venezuela’s troubled Andean neighbors by helping them strengthen their 
judicial systems, combat official corruption and develop new export industries. 
(“Ambitions,” 2000, p. A38, emphasis added) 
 
Belittling and selling short Bolívar’s achievement in winning the independence of 
the Andean region from Spanish colonial rule almost two centuries earlier, the Times 
instead positioned the U.S. as the guiding light toward liberation, stability and peace.  
The U.S., however, was not guaranteed success in civilizing the hemisphere, due to the 
struggle against the region’s more barbaric tendencies: “If he [George W. Bush] is to 
succeed as a free-trade proponent, which we hope he does, he must define more clearly 
how he proposes to achieve an agreement that will promote trade while ensuring that 
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nations cannot engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ by diluting their environmental 
regulations and labor laws to seek unfair trade advantages and attract investment” 
(“Selling,” 2001, p. A18).   
Elsewhere, the Times positioned the U.S. as the impartial overseer or protector of 
democracy in Venezuela, regardless of the U.S.’s well-documented history of vested 
interventions that speaks to the opposite: 
The best hope for a peaceful, democratic outcome to Venezuela’s political crisis 
may now rest in the mediation efforts of Jimmy Carter.  During his presidency 
Mr. Carter was a firm champion of democracy throughout Latin America, 
standing up to the military tyrannies that then predominated in the region…. 
The United States and five other nations trying to resolve the standoff hold their 
first meeting in Washington today.  Venezuelans of all persuasions should rally 
behind the Carter proposals. (“Preserving,” 2003, p. A22, emphasis added) 
 
The metaphor that the U.S. is a nurturing paternal figure emerged strongly in this 
era.  In the Colonial era, the Times eschewed the role of the U.S. as the protectorate of 
the uncivilized region in favor of pragmatic, self-interested intervention when necessary.  
In 2000, the editors began to argue that Washington should be paying more attention to 
Latin America, that we should be encouraging without being overbearing, and that it was 
our neglect of the region that had fostered the manifested and growing rebellion.  The 
therapeutic metaphor of maternal/paternal neglect obscured the extensive power the 
U.S. wields over Latin American economies, presenting them instead as all-too-
independent entities. 
Naturalization 
Naturalizing the suffering and chaos that seem so representative of the three 
continents in international reporting strips the events of their socially constructed 
aspects.  Rather than an effect of relationships of power and political decisions, equating 
social unrest with natural processes makes it appear cyclical, inevitable, and immutable.  
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This trope is particularly metaphorical, as it points to the analogies between the social 
and natural world in order to naturalize social relationships of power.  In this analysis, I 
found that the Times characterized a primitive state of nature in Venezuela at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, a nation on the brink of emerging from tropical jungle life in the 
mid-century, and by the end of the twentieth, a relapse of disease and contamination – a 
political, social and economic structure steeped and suffocating in oil. 
Colonial Era.  The naturalness and inevitability of social unrest in Venezuela 
during this time period was best captured by the Times’ editorial headlines: “The Muddle 
in Venezuela” (1903, p. 8), “The Venezuelan ‘Mess’” (1903, p. 8), “End of the Venezuelan 
Mess” (1903, p. 6), “Venezuela Again” (1904, p. 6), “The Venezuelan Porcupine” (1906, p. 
8).  The Times’ exasperation with the instability in the region that impeded commercial 
trade at the Venezuelan ports frequently focused on the primitive tendencies of Latin 
Americans to irrationally favor their Castro-dictators and violent revolutions:  
The theatrical resignation of Mr. Castro as President of Venezuela is only an 
added instance of the extreme difficulty of dealing with some of the South 
American Republics.  So far as it can now be interpreted it does not imply any 
radical change in the political situation, and probably his successor, his brother 
or another, will wield much the same power in much the same way. (“Muddle,” 
1903, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
The Times considered Cipriano Castro, and often by extension the political events in 
Venezuela, in animalistic or primitive terms. To the Times, Castro  
was a rascal of the most reckless sort and behaved himself after his kind… 
surrounded by a pack of foreign adventurers with whom his dealings were 
marked by alternations of corruption and violence, to whom he sold concessions 
of supposedly great value and from whom, when they incurred his animosity or 
excited his greed, he proceeded to take away the concessions and the profits, 
thereof. (“Venezuela,” 1908, p. 6, emphasis added) 
 
The role of the U.S., according to the Times, was partially to instruct Latin 
Americans in how best to resist their primitive urges and join civilization.  Revolution 
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may be “in blossom,” or “speedily ripen to maturity,” in several South American nations, 
but Puerto Rico, under the supervision of the United States, could prove the U.S.’s ability 
to control these forces of nature:  
We hope that ex-President Andrade’s confidence in the determination and ability 
of the United States to make law and order the normal condition of Puerto Rico, 
and revolution and disorder merely horrors of a past and discarded 
misgovernment, will be fully justified…. 
he may have the chance to discern that Spanish-speaking communities can get 
along without revolution, and that revolution may be prevented without the 
strong rule of dictators. (“Andrade’s,” 1899, p. 6, emphasis added) 
 
Cold War Era.  Likewise, the previously U.S.-supported dictatorship of Pérez 
Jiménez was repetitively characterized by the Times as a “brutal and predatory” state of 
nature.  During the revolt against Pérez Jiménez in 1958, the Times described a scene 
that resembles an uproar worthy of the tropical jungle where it took place: “President 
Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela still clings precariously to his dictatorial position….What we 
are seeing now is a lull between two storms….A palace revolution, a civil war, further 
uprisings, street riots, strikes, mass arrests – almost anything is possible now, except 
internal peace” (“Lull,” 1958, p. 28).    During the exile of Pérez Jiménez, the Times 
periodically provided updates on his whereabouts, which they casually termed his 
“present roosting-place” (“Unwelcome,” 1958, p. 28).  The metaphorical reference to the 
Latin American dictator as a bird of prey echoed the previous era. 
The unrest in Venezuela, however, did not end with deposition of the dictator, 
and the revolution in Cuba raised fresh concerns over the “ferment” and “profound 
roots” of continued uprisings: 
The Cuban revolution, from its inception three years ago, resembled the process 
of dropping a stone in a lake.  There is the splash – and then the ripples that go 
on and on until stopped by the solid shores.  The ripples, in this case, have not yet 
stopped.  Simultaneously with the hemispheric meeting of foreign ministers in 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, there have been bloody riots throughout Venezuela at 
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the other end of the South American continent” (“Glance,” 1962, p. 20, emphasis 
added). 
 
To the volcanic eruptions of revolution, the Times preferred a different inevitable and 
natural process – that of evolution:  
The leader who became President, Romulo Betancourt, is a democrat seeking the 
solution of Venezuela’s social and economic imbalance by evolutionary means…. 
The political structure was held together by President Betancourt’s big, 
moderate, centrist Acción Democrática party.  Now that party has split: the Right 
Wing watches apprehensively; the Left Wing riots.  The sum total is trouble 
(“Glance,” 1962, p. 20, emphasis added) 
 
The unrest was commonly understood by the Times as a tumultuous period of 
recovery after a long illness: “These are naturally difficult days and months while that 
shaken country recovers from the harmful effects of ten years of a brutal and predatory 
military dictatorship” (“Democracy in Venezuela,” 1958, p. 28).  “Countries that suffer 
the maltreatment of dictatorship for many years cannot recover quickly and easily” 
(“Venezuela is Saved,” 1958, p. 34).  “A nation that shakes off a dictatorship is like a 
person recovering from a severe illness.  Time, care and patience are needed before 
strength returns.  A relapse must be guarded against” (“Venezuela’s New,” 1959, p. 20).  
As seen in the editorial’s conclusion, this metaphor encourages surveillance and 
intervention in case the “illness” is not completely eradicated.  It also obscures the source 
of Venezuela’s unrest and uprisings as an abstract disease, rather than particular social 
conditions that could be changed. 
Current Era.  In 2002, the Times continued employing this metaphorical 
schema of illness, adapting it to emphasize the potential for contamination: “The 
Organization of American States has rightly identified insufficient press freedoms as a 
regional epidemic” (“Latin America’s Muzzled,” 2002, p. A22).  The resurgence of 
resistance toward the end of the century prompted the Times to again describe a 
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spreading of a dangerous disease throughout Latin America: “The particulars of their 
individual stories vary, but in recent years all five Andean nations of South America have 
suffered crippling bouts of political violence and instability” (“Turmoil,” 2003, p. A24).  
“The anti-establishment mood has spread, leading to populist soldiers and a coca grower 
taking the presidencies of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia.  Now Peru may elect the most 
dangerous leader yet” (“Peru’s,” 2006, p. A24).  The naturalization trope here reinforces 
the suspense and drama captured in the analysis of aestheticization, and the two tropes 
compliment each other to create a sense of fear and urgency that must be remedied: 
In a bitterly divided Venezuela, opposition leaders are threatening a general 
strike as part of their campaign to force President Hugo Chávez out of office.  
Next door in Colombia, fighting between leftist guerrillas and the army has 
intensified.  Argentina recently defaulted on a World Bank loan, jeopardizing 
access to urgently needed financing to ameliorate widespread 
suffering….Memories of brutal dictatorships may be too raw to imagine an 
epidemic of coups anytime soon, but authoritarian-minded governments may 
increasingly be tempted to capitalize on the widespread disenchantment to 
subvert the rule of law.  (“Beleaguered,” 2002, p. A26, emphasis added) 
 
“Washington has a strong stake in Venezuela’s recovery,” (“Hugo Chávez Departs,” 2002, 
p. A16), the Times argues, looking toward the administration for “economic 
prescriptions” (“Different,” 2005, p. A16) and “a healthy development” (“Thanks,” 2007, 
p. A20).  
In addition to the disease metaphors, the Times also showed signs of the jungle 
metaphor of the earlier colonial era, as the editors discussed “thorny hemispheric 
matters, most notably the crisis in Venezuela” (“Backtracking,” 2003, p. A14).  President 
Chávez himself “is an example of a president who is wildly unpopular with half his 
country, but fiercely defended by the other” (“Latin America’s Half-Term,” 2004, p. 
A26).  In the world’s dark jungles, the battle for civilization is hard won.  At times, the 
Times entertained the despair that nature cannot be controlled:  
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It is a widely noted paradox that striking oil can be disastrous for a poor 
country.  In Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Venezuela and many other places, oil and 
gas have brought corruption and strife.  Some of the reasons, such as oil’s 
distorting effects on exchange rates, trade balances and credit, are hard to 
combat…. 
In Nigeria, the public belief that oil companies participate in corruption has 
helped turn the oil-producing Niger Delta region into a battleground where 
companies face sabotage, kidnappings and shutdowns. (“Making,” 2003, p. A8, 
emphasis added) 
 
The natural tendency of oil to corrupt uncivilized peoples here induces the naïve, violent, 
and misdirected (pagan-like?) behavior of indigenous publics.  The Times hoped, 
however, that progressive initiatives of the global oil companies and non-governmental 
organizations to demand that “corrupt” governments disclose their revenues publicly 
would “give companies a tool to resist paying huge bribes and to breach confidentiality 
agreements they have signed with corrupt governments.  It would also help ensure that 
oil and gas revenues are used to create more prosperous and stable societies” (ibid).  
Thanks to the benevolent intentions of the world’s oil companies, the Times intimated, 
the world had a new “tool” with which to civilize human nature and defeat barbarity. 
Other Tropes 
Idealization, Insubstantialization, and Eroticization. 
This analysis did not uncover many examples of these three tropes.  One 
plausible explanation may be that the genre of editorials does not encourage them.  More 
artistic and expressive, they may be employed more substantially in the types of feature-
like articles that Spurr (1993) analyzed.  One interesting find that may be explored 
further with a different sample is a hint of adaptation in the trope of eroticization.   
The colonial-era editorial at times displayed the familiar understanding of the 
nation as a “she,” which lent itself to metaphorical understandings of the difference 
between civilized and barbarous acts of war: 
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If the two European powers had actually and openly gone to war with Venezuela, 
with the intent to punish her for outrageous acts, to seize her territory, or to 
repel her invading forces, everybody would understand, of course, that blood 
would have to be spilled.  But we have the assurance of those powers that they 
intend nothing of that kind…. 
The warships of Great Britain and Germany have gone to the coast of Venezuela, 
not to ravage and destroy, not to inflict punishment, but to collect moneys due 
of which payment has been refused. (“Arbitration,” 1902, p. 8, emphasis added) 
 
By the end of the twentieth century, these references to gendered violence are no 
longer socially or politically acceptable.  Homoeroticized analogies, by contrast, were 
employed as a new form of sexual deviancy in order to demonize political undesirables.  
The Times criticized “Mr. Chávez’s courtship of…the FARC,” “the spectacle of Mr. Castro 
and Mr. Chávez happily bantering in Caracas,” how Chávez “embraced Saddam 
Hussein,” “received Fidel Castro,”  “reached out to Marxist rebels” (“Ambitions,” 2000, 
p. A38), and “courted Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein” (“Hugo Chávez Departs,” 2002, 
p. A16).  Such descriptions of an orgy of vilified national leaders appeared in the Times’ 
approval of the violent coup d’état that occurred in Venezuela the day before.  This 
powerful use of sexualized language certainly deserves further scrutiny with a different 
sample. 
Resistance 
Spurr (1993) has argued that resistance to colonial discourse takes place in 
journalism when: a) ideological language is questioned from a non-Western point of 
view; b) the conditions of observation are questioned; c) non-objectivity is acknowledged 
and discussed; and d) other voices and perspectives are present.  The first three 
possibilities are those of self-reflection on the part of the Western journalist, but this is 
different from criticizing one or another U.S. policy.  When resisting colonial discourse, 
the “commanding view,” or the assumed authority to define and categorize, is itself 
analyzed.  The fourth possibility is the inclusion of the Other’s voice.  This last potential 
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for resistance is not static, and it is often difficult to ascertain the distinctions between 
acknowledging the Other’s voice as a position of authority and co-opting that voice to 
preserve the structures of power.  The former provides the space for change; the latter is 
often manifested as pretensions to self-criticism or a “balanced” analysis.  Regardless of 
a potential for editorials to reach beyond the traditional structures of reporting to assess 
and analyze international relationships and interactions, the Times, in this case, 
displayed little to no willingness to resist colonialist understandings of the global order.   
A few examples may point the way toward a better understanding of what is 
required to challenge our colonialist ideologies that underlie Our most trusted 
mainstream source of international news.  In 1961, an editorial printed the only quote of 
a non-Washington-based voice found in this sample.  Then-President Rómulo 
Betancourt warned of the lessons that must follow from President Kennedy’s recent visit 
to Latin America: “One was that Mr. Kennedy, at least for Venezuela, was ‘rectifying a 
long period of ignorance and lack of comprehension of the problems of Latin America 
and of faith placed in dictatorships.’  The other was that ‘unilateral action or individual 
intervention in dealing with any of these problems would mean the breakdown of the 
regional system’” (“At Journey’s,” 1961, p. 32).  This seems to be the only moment in the 
Times’ editorializing on Venezuela that the newspaper acknowledged the possibility that 
the U.S. may be ignorant of, or lack comprehension of, the needs, desires, or “problems” 
of Latin Americans.  Despite this acknowledgement, in the voice of the respected 
Betancourt, the newspaper consistently assumed that only the U.S. has evolved the 
political, social and economic knowledges necessary to lead Latin America from its dark 
ages into civilization.  Unfortunately, the argument did not come without a response 
from the editors that reinstated the global authority of the U.S.: “There was nothing 
  107
more important said on the whole trip than President Kennedy’s challenge to ‘the leaders 
of Latin America, the industrialists and the landowners…to admit past mistakes and 
accept new responsibilities.’” (ibid). 
In more recent editorials, the Times struggled to find a way to acknowledge the 
widespread resistance to the U.S.’s economic goals for Latin America without forfeiting 
its commanding view.  At times, this resulted in a mixed analysis of where the 
responsibility lay for the extensive poverty and inequality in the region:  
A decade of retrenching in the United States on trade, combined with economic 
and currency messes in several Latin American countries, particularly Argentina, 
have left governments with little appetite for opening markets.  Many 
governments south of the border blame the model of free trade, open markets, 
privatization and fiscal austerity pushed by the United States for the vast 
increase in social inequality in the region during the past decade. (“Free,” 2005, 
p. A16, emphasis added) 
 
Most often this analysis found its way into supporting increased involvement in Latin 
American affairs, but the Other’s voice was at least offered in this example. 
The only explicit adoption of an external point of view occurred in the Times’ 
admonishment of Pat Robertson’s televised call to assassinate Hugo Chávez and of the 
Bush administration’s tepid response toward Robertson.  The editors asked their readers 
to assume a non-U.S. perspective of the situation: “Imagine, for comparison purposes, 
what the White House would say if a Syrian mullah had gone on Al Jazeera and called for 
the assassination of the president of the United States” (“Judgment,” 2005, p. A22).  The 
editorial concluded, however, by sympathizing with the political difficulties for President 
Bush in reprimanding a leader of his electoral base: “That obviously makes things 
awkward for the president.  But common decency, not to mention a rational sense of the 
national interest, demands condemnation of his [Robertson’s] remarks,” even though 
Chávez had “declared his undying enmity for the Bush team” (ibid).  This conclusion 
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neutralized the perspective of Venezuelans on the issue, continued to demonize Chávez, 
and defined its demands for an official reprimand in terms of “common decency” and 
“national interest.”  The end result was to position Washington as the most decent and 
unfairly implicated player in this sordid business. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and 
nothing to learn from them is not just. 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of 
barbarism. 
 
Walter Benjamin 
 
 
By relying on understandings of world politics that were generated to legitimize 
the colonial system, The New York Times reinforces a 500-year-old oppressive 
distinction between the European modern Self and the primitive barbaric Other.  This 
distinction lies at the base of the ideology of modernization, of which journalism seems 
to be one of the most prominent and ubiquitous popularizers.  Analyzing the different 
manifestations of colonial discourse according to Spurr’s (1993) model has illuminated a 
continuity of thought in the Times from the end of high colonialism at the turn of the 
nineteenth century to the imposition of neocolonialism at the turn of the twentieth.  
Continuity is important for this type of analysis because it highlights the genealogy of our 
assumptions about people and the world.  We may take our assumptions for granted, but 
the identification of an undesirable lineage can startle us into questioning “natural” 
definitions and boundaries.  
Given the evidence above, I argue that the basis for our knowledge and 
understanding of international relations and policy regarding Venezuela is the 
colonialist-imperialist distinction between Self and Other that has historically provided 
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the ideological support for exploitation.  Knowledge-producing institutions such as The 
New York Times are implicated as the reproducers and reinforcers of this colonial 
knowledge.  More than jingoistic propaganda (Rodríguez, 1998), the editorializing 
described above defines, inscribes, represents identities in colonizing gestures to provide 
justification for U.S. intervention.  If, as Derrida has argued, the process of 
subordination begins in the discursive act of naming, classifying, and defining 
boundaries, then journalism bears a significant responsibility as the modern popularizer 
of the categories of subordination.  In the case of Venezuela in the Times, I have here 
analyzed the three time periods in which a sustained discursive effort to define, stage and 
delimit the international roles of Venezuela and the U.S. was undertaken by the editors 
of the newspaper. 
Establishing the Legal Structures and Standards 
 Editorials on Venezuela in The New York Times from 1897 to 1908 provide 
insight into the discursive work of an emerging global superpower and how that 
emergence was predicated on subordinating and subsuming the Other.  This has strong 
implications for the concept of a Self-made U.S., or Western, civilization that maintains 
its ideological dominance today.  This discursive work and its implications must be 
acknowledged, understood and criticized so that we can begin to unravel and imagine the 
hybridity and mutual evolution that has taken place globally since the onset of 
colonialism.   
In the case of the Times on Venezuela, the ultimate work done during this era was 
to establish a clear distinction between the civility of an international legal system and 
the barbarity of war and violence.  This boundary defined law as nonviolence and 
violence as non-law.  Legal arbitration was classified and defined as an impartial and 
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peaceful method by polarizing acts of violence and acts of law.  The most significant 
ideological work done during this era seems to establish this – that law and violence are 
two distinct categories, related in an either/or opposition.  This understanding hides the 
violence of civilization and law by defining that problem as Other.  In other words, the 
method of violence is excluded from “the test of reason and justice,” as a primitive, pre-
modern natural tendency, presenting an artificial choice between fair and impartial civil 
law or bloodshed and tyranny. 
All this work allows the “reason and justice” to stand on its own, defined only as 
the negative of violence, the negative of unfairness, bias, and fraudulence.  This 
fundamental distinction was then built upon to ultimately reach the conclusion that the 
highest order of humanity is to be found in free trade.  As seen in the drama of 
arbitrating boundaries, debts and ownership rights of the era, civilization and law were 
not separable from the benevolently-perceived role of capital in the quest for betterment 
of humanity.  The banality of horror and the ridiculous, lawless, and animalistic behavior 
of the Other set the stage for the unobjectionable intervention of the U.S. on behalf of 
Venezuela.  This intervention was rarely presented as direct meddling or use of colonial 
force, but rather was understood as a neutral and fair mediation between helpless 
Venezuela and its European bullies.  In this understanding, the U.S. acted as a channel 
for Others to establish rights and responsibilities in authorized, legitimate legal 
documents.  Only then could the fair and impartial relationships of commerce and free 
exchange take root.   
Moreover, and this is an interesting distinction from the colonial discourse of 
Europe, the emergence of the U.S. as global superpower was also predicated on 
subordinating European mercantilist and imperial systems as a less sophisticated and 
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immoral form of government.  The universal hierarchical order polices and regulates all 
nations, with the U.S. positioned as the naturally evolved leader – the fittest morally, 
politically, economically and technologically to take charge of global relationships.   
As Europeans learned lessons of the morality of liberty, Venezuelans learned lessons of 
business and financial wisdom, and the U.S. lead the way to prosperity, growth, progress 
and mechanical efficiency.  The fraudulence, piracy, greed and predatory nature that the 
Times so colorfully and metaphorically identified in Venezuela left a massive void for 
U.S. civilization – the assumed opposite of all these undesirable qualities – to fill with 
frictionless, virtuous and contractual modernization.  
Shifting Focus to Political Structures 
Establishing the legal structure for political and economic relations between the 
U.S. and Venezuela occurred during the reign of dictators that held power for the first 
half of the twentieth century.  Increasing resistance to these reigns required a hegemonic 
shift in political structure in Venezuela.  The commanding view of The New York Times 
followed suit, demanding and ensuring moderate democratic reform at the expense of 
revolutionary economic overhaul.  By the late 1930s, the discursive battle to establish 
legal confidence in the mining contracts between U.S. companies and Venezuela had 
been won.  Standard Oil and Shell collectively controlled 85 per cent of oil extraction in 
Venezuela; the moderate democrat Betancourt promised to maintain the established 
structures of power in exchange for a larger Venezuelan share in the oil profits, so the 
threat of nationalization was diminished (Coronil, 1997).  Thus, the late 1950s and 1960s 
proved to be a “friendly” period between the U.S. and Venezuela, especially in the midst 
of the Cuban revolution and its Soviet implications.   
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All of this background information was characterized in the Times as a vague 
“journey” for Venezuelans out of the dark ages of pre-modern dictatorship and into 
civilized modern life.  This was the same linear journey as told by the “chapters” and 
“pages of history” of the previous era of editorials.  Through metaphors of nature and 
violence, the “brutal and predatory” nature of dictatorship was equated with Communist 
resistance, creating an anachronistic category of government that enveloped both.  The 
equation of a Venezuelan Communist resistance that never came to power with the 
previous centuries of colonialism and dictatorial caudillos performed two tasks at once: 
it reinforced the colonialist understanding of the Venezuelan lack of history, politics and 
economics and also denied all possibilities for the future apart from civilized commerce 
and political reform.  As the Times argued, no one wanted the “clock” to be turned back 
to the days of violence and lawlessness – even if it were possible to turn back time – 
when Venezuelans could look forward to heartwarming international friendship and 
modernization made in the Western image.  Again, we have the either/or distinction 
between bloodshed and law, only now the concepts of civic politics and friendship 
complemented the representation of law as a rejection of violence.   
The dramatic climax denoted the emergence of Venezuela into the realm of 
civilization as democratic consensus triumphed over the barbarity of infighting.  The 
hopes of humanity for freedom and democracy were pinned on this climax.  Were the 
Latin Americans civil or barbaric?  Was the Other ready for self-rule (self-colonization)?  
The valiant centrist Rómulo Betancourt, with the help of President Kennedy and Senator 
Rockefeller, seemed to make the case for the Times that Venezuelans were finally ready 
to emerge from non-history into the history of the West.  The native preference for 
democracy was understood as a preference for civilization that in turn was understood as 
  114
a preference for U.S. investment.  The ultimate destination for this “uphill” Venezuelan 
journey was defined by the Times as modern economic standards and efficiency, most 
importantly institutionalized as a slow, stable, and moderate process.  The industries, 
schools, roads, housing and public projects demanded by the “masses” could only be 
implemented through the slow, gradual process of capital investment.  Only capital had 
the best interests of the Venezuelans at heart.  The goal for Venezuelan democracy, for 
the Times, was to ensure the stability necessary for investments to do their work.  Much 
like the job of dictators. 
Completing the Project with Economic Rationality 
 By 1989, the legal structures necessary to protect international capital and the 
political structures to legitimate it had long been established in Venezuela.  It was now 
time, according to the dictates of world financial organizations, to implement the 
economic structures in Latin America that would fully liberate the capital necessary to 
raise all boats.  The majority of Venezuelans, however, still poor after decades of oil 
wealth and democracy, did not seem to understand the benevolent intentions of 
international capital and U.S. free-trade policy.  They rioted in the streets when their 
president tried to impose the World Bank’s austerity measures at the expense of his 
adamant campaign promises to the opposite.  Later indicting the same president on 
corruption charges, the people began to mobilize along alternative party lines.  
Eventually, Hugo Chávez was elected as the first socialist president of Venezuela in 1998 
and has maintained a wide majority of electoral support among Venezuelans since, 
combating U.S. influence in the Latin American region. 
 How did the Times assess and analyze these political and economic changes in 
Venezuela and their implications for the U.S.?  Unfortunately, as is shown above, it 
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emphasized much of the same colonialist assumptions identified in earlier eras, with 
various new metaphors and others dusted off and re-packaged.  Contrary to the hopes of 
the civilized world, the Venezuelans’ barbarity proved difficult to eradicate.  Corruption 
and protectionism had squandered the wealth as well as opportunity for Venezuela’s one 
valuable natural resource, and democracy failed to distribute oil wealth more fairly due 
to too much political consensus.  This was, of course, understood as a failure of 
Venezuelans to rule themselves wisely, invoking therapeutic metaphors in the editorials 
that hinted of too much independence too soon for the developing nation.  Much like a 
teenager would, given the neglect of attention from a wiser and more experienced role 
model, poor Venezuelans felt like “neglected stepchildren” and unwisely chased after 
trendy and fashionable populist rhetoric at the expense of their long-term well-being.  
The resulting corruption and waste was not the result of international financial 
structures that cripple Venezuelan attempts to diversify the economy beyond oil and 
encourage rent-capturing instead (Coronil, 1997), but rather was the result of the 
ignorance, weakness and self-victimization of Venezuelans and of the heart of darkness 
that the physical material of oil naturally evokes in mankind.   
 The Times imagines the situation in Venezuela as a reversion to an antiquated 
state of nature, wherein humans fail to control the barbarity of both external nature and 
their own and capitulate to a self-destructive anachronism that is not only as regressive 
as dictatorship but “destined to fail” as well.  As an anachronism, the leftist resurgence in 
Latin America is by definition the antithesis of modernization.  As the jungle steals back 
in to destroy modern life in Venezuela, crony capitalists (evoking the image of pirates 
used in the previous eras) anachronistically hoard their booty in the form of “cash” or 
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“arms,” and only Westernized nations and institutions are in a position to demand an 
end to the lawlessness, corruption or bribery.   
What all this obscures is twofold: that “crony capitalism” is no less rampant 
within the U.S. than without, and that this outcome is the direct result of law, order and 
civilization as promoted by the Times and established by U.S. governments and 
companies.  It is not a reversion, but rather part of the same evolution.  The scenario 
heralded as truth by the Times, however, allows us to imagine a distinct boundary 
between Our community as self-made and virtuous and Theirs as barbaric and diseased, 
when no such boundary actually exists.   
The emergent metaphorical understanding of an epidemic of populism in need of 
a Washington “economic prescription” links with the understanding of the hemisphere 
as a neighborhood to reproduce and engage the fear of contamination that seems quite 
characteristic of this era.  In the more recent editorials, much less than those of the 
previous two eras in this case, an overwhelming concern was not only to save the 
barbarians from themselves by “strengthening judicial systems” and “developing new 
export industries” – concerns consistent throughout the century – but also now to save 
ourselves from the barbarians.  With a very modernist sense of anxiety and loss, and in 
the most neutral, impartial and professional terms available, the Times described a 
crippling, desperate, polarized and violent antagonism that is spreading throughout the 
neighborhood, eating away at the pillars of civilization.  This imagined positioning of the 
U.S. as an island in a sea of chaos and violence is an incredibly powerful form of 
knowledge, especially as taken for granted by The New York Times, one of the more 
powerful knowledge-making institutions in the world.  It arguably triggers a defense 
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mechanism in US that reacts aggressively to quell the aggression that has been caused, in 
large part, by our previous acts of aggressive intervention. 
News Discourse and International Structures of Power 
Dominant histories of Western development incessantly maintain “that 
modernity is the offspring of a self-propelled West” (Coronil, 1997, p. 7) and that 
capitalism is “a self-generated system that expands from active modern regions and 
engulfs passive traditional societies” (p. 8).  This ritualistic repetition obscures the 
complex reality that actually takes place, not to mention the historical impossibility of a 
West by itself.  As seen in this ideological analysis of the Times, the national imagining of 
the U.S. as a benevolent leader at the peak of civilization reproduces and reinforces our 
demand that other nations of the world follow our lead and modernize or risk 
backwardness and underdevelopment.  In terms of Venezuelan history, what this 
imagining obscures are the hybridity and mutual dependence of modernization and 
exploitation.  What ends up happening in nations such as Venezuela, according to 
Coronil, is a proliferation of “subaltern modernities.”  Venezuela’s history reminds us 
that: 
The collusion between foreign oil companies and a regional caudillo brought 
together the most dynamic corporations of the capitalist world and the most 
characteristic form of rule in nineteenth century Latin America.  As in many 
other instances in Latin America’s history, the paradoxical result of the region’s 
engagement with modernity was to reinforce practices and institutions 
considered to be traditional but which were the transcultural product of previous 
exchanges between European and American cultures.  (Coronil, 1997, p. 83) 
 
 The amnesia of the always-already hybridity described by Coronil’s study of 
Venezuela is essential to the discursive work of exclusion, or Othering, that is itself 
essential to nation-building.  The severance of the historical lineage of asymmetrical 
relations of power allows us to imagine a boundary and distinct histories that release the 
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West from a sense of responsibility.  The imagining and forgetting taking place here is 
popularized by journalism to the point of invisibility by identifying a modern 
metropolitan center and a pre-modern periphery.  The distinction, however, has never 
existed.  They are two parts of the same process of modernization. 
Today, the relationship between international capital and Venezuela demands 
that Venezuelans relinquish “a ‘fantasy’ world of petroleum wealth” in favor of “the ‘real’ 
world of the market” (Coronil, p. 391).  This demand, according to Coronil, is a 
hegemonic force that corresponds to the increasingly abstract fetishism of money and 
finance and the institutionalization of debt crisis and economic rationality.  From 
dictator to unified democracy to depersonalized global money, the Times has 
consistently demanded that Venezuela emerge from an imaginary periphery into an 
imaginary modernity.  The force of these demands and their rationality alter our 
historical understanding of ourselves and our place in the world, and these leaps of 
imagination work to maintain the dominant structures of power. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 This is a predominantly exploratory analysis, as not much work has been done in 
this area of journalism studies.  Further research of various cases in various sources of 
journalism would refine and complicate what I have found here.  This would perhaps 
especially be the case if journalism in the three continents is analyzed and compared to 
the findings in the U.S.  Moreover, this study was limited in its ability to identify and 
theorize modes of discourse that are resistant to colonialist understandings.  Further 
research should function with this goal in mind in order that we may not only criticize 
old understandings but also, carefully, identify new ones. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Cited Articles from The New York Times 
 
Colonial 
1897 
A page of history. (1897, February 4), p. 6. 
The Venezuela report. (1897, March 3), p. 6. 
1898 
Andrade’s refuge. (1898, November 6), p. 6. 
1899 
Venezuela and Alaska. (1899, October 7), p. 6. 
The Venezuela arbitration. (1899, October 5), p. 6. 
The victory at Paris. (1899, October 4), p. 8. 
1901 
A chapter of American history. (1901, July 10), p. 6. 
The new canal treaty. (1901, July 19), p. 6. 
The trouble in Venezuela. (1901, January 18), p. 6. 
1902 
Arbitration for Venezuela. (1902, December 13), p. 8. 
At war with Venezuela. (1902, December 18), p. 8. 
Blockade and arbitration. (1902, December 21), p. 6. 
British and German policy. (1902, December 12), p. 8. 
The case of Venezuela. (1902, December 10), p. 8. 
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Coercing Venezuela. (1902, December 5), p. 8. 
Coming to an agreement. (1902, December 20), p. 8. 
The Hague tribunal. (1902, December 25), p. 6. 
Justice and progress. (1902, December 30), p. 8. 
Mr. Roosevelt as arbitrator. (1902, December 23), p. 8. 
A pacific settlement. (1902, December 16), p. 8. 
Venezuela. (1902, December 11), p. 8. 
1903 
End of the Venezuelan mess. (1903, February 15), p. 6. 
The German way. (1903, January 23), p. 8. 
The muddle in Venezuela. (1903, March 23), p. 8. 
A near view of Castro. (1903, February 19), p. 8. 
No entangling alliances. (1903, February 1), p. 6. 
The path of peace. (1903, February 10), p. 8. 
The Venezuelan “mess.” (1903, February 15), p. 6. 
1904 
Anglo-American arbitration. (1904, January 11), p. 6. 
Venezuela again. (1904, August 2), p. 6. 
The Venezuelan award. (1904, February 23), p. 6. 
We build a glass house. (1904, January 21), p. 8. 
1905 
Castro and the powers. (1905, March 22), p. 8. 
France and Venezuela. (1905, March 19), p. 8. 
Un president de boheme. (1905, September 11), p. 6. 
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Venezuela. (1905, June 21), p. 6. 
Venezuela and Santo Domingo. (1905, March 26), p. 8. 
1906 
Castro and France. (1906, January 20), p. 8. 
Lawmakers and lawbreakers. (1906, July 3), p. 8. 
The Venezuelan porcupine. (1906, February 1), p. 8. 
1907 
Editorial. (1907, January 20), p. 6. 
1908 
Holland and Venezuela. (1908, December 15), p. 8. 
Venezuela. (1908, December 24), p. 6. 
The Venezuela botheration. (1908, April 2), p. 6. 
 
Cold War 
1958 
Democracy at work. (1958, February 26), p. 26. 
Democracy in Venezuela. (1958, September 4), p. 28. 
Lull in Venezuela. (1958, January 16), p. 28. 
Opportunity in Venezuela. (1958, November 3), p. 36. 
Unwelcome guest. (1958, March 18), p. 28. 
Venezuela is saved again. (1958, September 9), p. 34. 
The Venezuelan campaign. (1958, November 19), p. 36. 
Venezuela’s election. (1958, December 10), p. 38. 
Venezuela’s triumph. (1958, January 24), p. 22. 
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Writing on the wall. (1958, January 10), p. 22. 
A Yankee in South America. (1958, November 21), p. 28. 
1959 
Venezuela’s new president. (1959, February 14), p. 20. 
Venezuela’s fruitful year. (1959, December 7), p. 30. 
1960 
Venezuela stands firm. (1960, April 24), p. E8. 
The Venezuelan plots. (1960, September 14), p. 42. 
1961 
At journey’s end. (1961, December 19), p. 32. 
Flare-up in Venezuela. (1961, June 27), p. 32. 
Latin-American trip. (1961, December 17), p. E8. 
More trouble in Venezuela. (1961, February 21), p. 34. 
President Kennedy’s trip. (1961, December 13), p. 42. 
1962 
A Glance at Venezuela. (1962, January 27), p. 20. 
Ferment in Venezuela. (1962, May 9), p. 40. 
1963 
The man from Caracas. (1963, February 19), p. 6. 
Terror in Venezuela. (1963, November 30), p. 22. 
Victory in Venezuela. (1963, December 3), p. 42. 
1964 
Venezuelan succession. (1964, March 10), p. 36. 
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1965 
The Moscow-Caracas plot. (1965, April 17), p. 18. 
Tragedy in Venezuela. (1965, February 22), p. 20. 
1967 
Latin democrats in crisis. (1967, November 17), p. 46. 
O.A.S. dilemma on Cuba. (1967, September 24), p. 214. 
1968 
Venezuela expands. (1968, September 12), p. 46. 
 
Current 
1998 
Venezuela’s electoral revolt. (1998, December 8), p. A26. 
1999 
Emergence of a Venezuelan potentate. (1999, August 21), p. A12. 
2000 
The ambitions of Hugo Chávez. (2000, November 6), p. A38. 
Consolidating power in Venezuela. (2000, August 2), p. A24. 
The petro-curse. (2000, July 31), p. A18. 
2001 
Containing Colombia’s troubles. (2001, January 15), p. A14. 
The selling of free trade. (2001, April 24), p. A18. 
2002 
A beleaguered hemisphere. (2002, November 22), p. A26. 
Hugo Chávez departs. (2002, April 13), p. A16. 
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Latin America’s muzzled press. (2002, April 4), p. A22. 
Venezuela on the brink. (2002, December 18), p. A34. 
Venezuela’s political turbulence. (2002, April 16), p. A26. 
2003 
Backtracking on Mexico. (2003, January 11), p. A14. 
Making oil transparent. (2003, July 6), p. A8. 
Preserving democracy in Venezuela. (2003, January 24), p. 22. 
Turmoil in the Andes. (2003, March 12), p. A24. 
2004 
Brazil’s moment. (2004, January 24), p. A14. 
Hugo Chávez wins. (2004, August 18), p. A22. 
Latin America’s half-term presidents. (2004, February 26), p. 26. 
A recall vote in Venezuela. (2004, June 10), p. A28. 
2005 
A different Latin America. (2005, December 24), p. A16. 
Free trade begins at home. (2005, November 5), p. A16. 
Hugo Chávez and his helpers. (2005, December 10), p. A14. 
Judgment malfunction. (2005, August 25), p. A22. 
President Bush’s walkabout. (2005, November 8), p. A26. 
2006 
Beyond the slogans in Latin America. (2006, January 10), p. A24. 
Mexico’s election. (2006, June 19), p. A18. 
Peru’s looming disaster. (2006, May 3), p. A24. 
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2007 
Thanks to Mr. Chávez. (2007, March 7), p. A20. 
Venezuela Inc.’s hostile takeover. (2007, January, 10), p. A22. 
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